Scaling-up Fair Trade and Local Food
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1 Introduction
Alternative Food Networks (AFNs) include a set of social movements that aim to mitigate the injustices (including the unsustainability) of contemporary food systems (Goodman, Dupuis, and Goodman 2011). These social movements include two that I will focus on in this paper: local food (‘locavorism’) and Fair Trade. Both local food and Fair Trade harness consumer demand for ‘ethical products’ to promote food justice. I will discuss some of the moral reasons that advocates of AFNs put forward in debates about how best to scale-up their favored practices. It may help to begin by saying something about the core aims and attributes of Fair Trade and Local food.

Fair Trade aims at (among other things) mitigating the systemic harms of the international food trade and, in particular, the harms experienced by farmers and agricultural workers in the developing world. For example, under current conditions, peasant farmers in developing societies face disruptive price instability (and generally low prices) for their goods. Peasant agricultural workers often experience exploitation and unsafe working conditions. The international food trade has done little to bring these workers, and their broader communities, out of desperate (< $2/day) poverty. At the same time, many of the farming methods used in developing societies harm the environment and generate short- and long-term risks to community-members’ health. The Fair Trade movement aims to mitigate these harms in the following way: Farmers and agricultural producers who practice environmentally sustainable methods, who treat their workers fairly, and who provide safe working conditions are allowed to label their products as ‘Fair Trade’. Consumers are willing to pay a price premium for these ethically-labeled products (Fairtrade International 2014). These higher prices provide higher (and stable) prices to farmers and wages to agricultural workers. They also finance development grants for poor agricultural communities.
Local food also aims to mitigate the systemic harms caused by contemporary food systems. Consider the oft-cited claim that the average meal in the United States travels 1500 miles from farm to plate (Pirog 2001; Pollan 2007; McKibben 2008). This travel expends much energy and emits much carbon. At the same time, many people (even) in the developed world do not have access to nutrient-rich fresh foods, but live in ‘food deserts’ (Walker, Keane, and Burke 2010). Finally, many communities in the developed world are almost entirely reliant on the international food trade for their subsistence. Even small disruptions in our complex globe-spanning food networks can cause food insecurity (at least in the short-term). Local food movements aim to mitigate these harms in the following ways: When you buy food from local farmers (at Farmers Markets or through Community Supported Agriculture (CSA) and local food cooperative buying programs, etc.) your ‘food miles’ plummet; your food-related carbon footprint may diminish dramatically (Brown 2009). At the same time, you may increase local access to fresh and nutrient-rich food products. And, increased investment in local food practices contributes to the formation of more stable food system – one that partially insulates members of one’s community from disruptions to global food systems (Delind 2006; Lien and Nerlich 2004).

There are pressing questions about how best to continue to scale-up Fair Trade and local food. A central worry is whether AFNs can continue to grow while retaining some of their most cherished attributes. In particular, advocates of AFNs sometimes disagree about whether they ought to be willing to compromise the direct connections and personal relationships that current AFNs often foster between small-scale producers and individual consumers. AFNs that partner with mid- and large-scale farms, or with large corporate agricultural distribution and retail operations, may be able to take advantage of economies of scale and, thereby, deliver AFN products at a lower price premium (and at more accessible venues). There is good evidence that the current (high) price premium on AFN foods is a barrier to scaling-up AFNs (Grebitus, Lusk, and Nayga Jr 2013). And there is reason to think that wider availability of AFN products would make them more popular, too. Therefore, compromising AFNs’ traditional commitment to direct exchanges and personal relationships may expand the market share of AFNs, and allow them to better promote the various goals of food justice.

This paper focuses on the question of whether AFNs ought to make the sorts of compromises that I just discussed. Of course, there are many distinct AFNs (e.g. farmers markets in the United States, Fair Trade labeled coffee from Brazil), and questions of about how to best scale-up each must ultimately be dealt with separately. But, for the purpose of this paper, I try to stay at
the level of general principles, with the hope that doing so can be helpful in later (and more focused) discussions. My goal is to focus on some morally important distinctions between different reasons one might give for resisting growth-based compromises to current forms of AFNs.

It may be helpful to sketch a positive argument for the general sort of compromise I have in mind: I take it for granted that there is a weighty *pro tanto* reason to scale-up AFNs, if scaling-up AFNs will substantially promote the justice (which includes the sustainability) of contemporary food systems. In this paper, I will assume that scaling-up AFNs will substantially promote food justice (with some possible exceptions I address later). So, the question is whether there are reasons in favor of maintaining the current shape of AFNs that are sufficiently weighty to defeat a *pro tanto* reason in favor of scaling-up AFNs. In the following sections, I review three kinds of reasons for maintaining the direct connections and personal relationships that are often a feature of contemporary AFNs: Alternative Food Aestheticism (section 3), ‘Direct Connection’ Absolutism (section 4) and Anti-Capitalist Absolutism (section 5).

2 Two cases
A pair of examples may help to illustrate some of the potential trade-offs that face decision-makers who are thinking about how best to scale-up AFNs.

First, consider the disagreements that resulted in Fair Trade USA (FT USA) splintering from Fairtrade International (FLO) in 2011. Fair Trade USA claimed that they wanted to increase the number of people who could benefit from Fair Trade, but that Fairtrade International’s policies (e.g. of working only with small farming cooperatives and avoiding partnerships with large corporations) were holding them back. According to FT USA, “the Fair Trade movement has a calling: to be inclusive and to embrace the needs of the entire rural community, including farm laborers on larger farms” (Fair Trade USA 2014). In an earlier statement, FT USA had argued that their new efforts, i.e. to work with large plantations and to partner with agricultural corporations “will extend the benefits of Fair Trade to millions more farmers and workers, and U.S. businesses will have more supply options, offering them move opportunity to do more good for more people” (Raynolds 2012, 285). Laura Raynolds further summarizes the position of FT USA: “by growing the market and increasing mainstream corporate participation, more producers will benefit from Fair Trade prices and premiums” (Raynolds 2012, 285). Fairtrade International responded to FT USA’s break from their organization by insisting that “Fair Trade is about more than premium or prices, it’s
philosophical,” where the relevant “philosophical” values include a commitment to working directly with small cooperative farms (Fairtrade International 2012).

In the case of local food, there are ongoing debates about how to grow locavorism beyond Farmers Markets and Community Supported Agriculture. For example, some support classifying geographically-nearby mid- and large-scale sustainable agricultural production as ‘local food’. Others are working to get locally-grown foods sold at corporate grocery stores and purchased by state institutions (e.g. public schools). In contrast, many participants in local food communities worry about ‘corporate cooptation’ of their movements. They resist expanding their movements in ways that do not preserve direct exchanges between farmers and consumers. Phil Mount (2012) has a good summary of many of these challenges. He concludes that “[t]he potential to reach a broader audience and to effect change on a larger scale is undeniably enticing. However, increased scale raises the concern that this new animal might somehow escape, grow beyond control” (Mount 2012, 117). He argues that efforts to expand local food ought to be tempered by considerations of what will be sacrificed (and what will be risked). In particular, we should worry about the risks to the values associated with direct connections between small-scale producers and individual consumers.

People have different reasons for resisting scaling up Fair Trade and local food. (After all, these two AFNs are very different from each other.) However, there is substantial overlap to the concerns that people raise: In the case of both Fair Trade and local food, people are worried that buying from larger farms and partnering with corporations will sacrifice something important, even if doing so will grow AFNs. In the following sections, I distinguish some different ways to think about the importance of the sacrifices that might be entailed by scaling up Fair Trade and local food.

3 Alternative food aestheticism
One set of reasons for resisting changes to existing forms of AFNs responds to the value of a particular kind of aestheticized consumer experience, one that more-direct connections between producers and consumers makes possible. I will not try to provide necessary and sufficient conditions for what I call alternative food aestheticism, since I’m not sure this could be done. Instead, I will reflect upon a few examples, in the hope that these illustrate a ‘family resemblance’ conception of aestheticized consumption in AFNs.4

First, consider the pleasure (and the encounter with beauty) that someone may experience while spending a Saturday morning leisurely meandering through a Farmers Market. At the Market, she has a series of short conversations with familiar faces – farmers, butchers, bakers, and makers of
artisanal crafts. Later in the day, she prepares a meal with the food products she purchased at the Market – cheese, lettuce, chicken, pastries – and she reflects upon the stories (and the people) that are attached to each of these products. As her family and friends gather around the table, she enjoys the fact that this immediate fellowship is made possible by an even broader community of local food producers, a broader community of which she is a member. (Nikki McClure’s gorgeously-illustrated 2011 children’s book, *To Market, to Market*, celebrates these aesthetic values – and could make almost anyone long for the experience of shopping at a Farmers Market.)

One might experience a similar aestheticized consumerism through Community Supported Agriculture (CSA). Consider someone who looks forward to driving to a local farm each week to pick up a box of just-harvested produce. Imagine him leading his children down the rows of growing crops, and think on their joy at seeing one week’s plants-in-the-ground become next week’s food-in-the-basket. Over the weeks of the harvesting season, our aesthete may come to know the farmer and the farm workers, and he may feel as if he is a part of the farm. In this way, the ‘share’ that he has bought in his CSA entails not only his right to consume a part of the farm’s produce, but is also an invitation to participate in the emotional experiences of the lifecycle of the farm.

Alternative food aestheticism seems possible in the case of Fair Trade, too. Here, consider a person who delights in finding a Fair Trade product with which she resonates. She is pleased to ‘get to know’ the people who her purchases may benefit. Should she purchase Arabica beans grown by a small community of peasants in Alto Jequitibá, Brazil? (They are building a school this year.) Perhaps she should buy chocolate from a small town in Ivory Coast? One of the town’s residents, Kouame Fasseri, has answered questions from customers on the Fairtrade Foundation’s website. He shares that “[m]y wife has been ill on many occasions, and because of Fairtrade…I am able to pay for her medication and treatment” (Fairtrade Foundation 2014). I imagine our Fair Trade aesthete enjoying the act of attaching names and faces to the idea of the ‘poor farmers’ who will receive stable prices (and development grants) because of her purchases of coffee and chocolate. Of course, we may assume that it also matters to her that she is helping people. But her consumer experience of (imagined) direct connections with farmers and agricultural workers makes her feel especially good.

I think that the sort of aesthetic values I discuss in these examples are real values; they matter. They can provide reasons for action and, in particular, they may ground reasons to act in ways that preserve these aesthetic values. Some authors, including Ostrom and Jussaume (2007) and Feagan (2008) argue that one cannot scale-up local food without losing these sorts of values. It seems clear to me that there is good reason to regret the loss of these aesthetic values, even if they
are lost as a result of scaling-up AFNs in order to better promote food justice. We have reason to regret the loss of what is valuable, even if we have good reason for acting in ways that lead to a sacrifice of something valuable. The question, then, is not whether there are reasons to protect alternative food aestheticism – I readily admit there are – but whether these reasons are sufficiently weighty to justify resisting forms of scaling-up AFN that may place the aesthetic values of alternative food consumerism at risk.

Recall that the core purpose of AFNs is to make current food systems less unjust (Jarosz 2008). (AFNs are not accidents of market demand; they have come from a particular history of activism and advocacy for food justice.) If one is attached to AFNs, I think one should be primarily attached to the primary purpose of AFNs. Therefore, someone who resists scaling-up AFNs because of his commitment to the aesthetic values associated with contemporary forms of alternative food seems to miss the point of alternative food. Such a person seems not to have properly evaluated her reasons, if she thinks that she best performs ‘ethical consumption’ by acting in ways that resist further reductions in contemporary food injustices, only so that she can protect her access to a particular consumer aesthetic.

In response, one may defend the choice to prioritize the aesthetic values of AFNs by observing that morality sometimes permits personal pursuits. We do not always have to be in the business of making the world a less unjust place. For example, I take it for granted that I am morally permitted to purchase a gift for my children, even if I want to do this only so that I will cause (and participate in) the joy that the gift will bring. I am morally permitted to purchase this gift, even if my money could better promote justice if I gave it to the American Civil Liberties Union (ACLU). In a similar way, morality allows people to prioritize the personal pleasures they experience through alternative food consumerism, even when forgoing those pleasures would better promote food justice. So, what’s the basis for my objection?

I grant the point that morality may permit one to resist forms of AFNs that would better promote food justice, in the name of preserving the aesthetic values of contemporary AFNs. But someone making this defense would have to admit that their ultimate reason for ‘ethical consumption’ is not ethics, but aesthetics. And I suspect that many of those who would resist scaling-up AFNs on aesthetic grounds will deny this. They will claim that they have ultimately ethical reasons for choosing AFNs. I have tried to show that this is untenable. Someone who chooses to defend aesthetic values at a cost to ethical values, within a particular sphere of activity, cannot claim that her choices within that sphere of activity are ultimately driven by ethical values.
4 ‘Direct Connection’ Absolutism

Another reason one might give for resisting scaling-up AFNs is that the ‘direct connections’ present in current forms of AFNs are essential for food justice. The idea here is not that one should preserve aesthetic consumption, but that it would be counterproductive to the goals of food justice to surrender aspects of current AFNs that are essential to justice. This sort of objection takes two main forms.

Epistemic communitarianism

First, one might be committed to a sort of epistemic communitarianism, according to which direct connections between individu- al and associations are a necessary condition of ‘seeing that justice is done’. Knowing your farmers may be necessary for knowing that your farmers are being treated well, or that the money you spend is actually going to support your local agricultural industry. For example, Delind says that local food is “characterized by the direct, face to face interaction of area farmers, business owners (e.g., restaurant owners, dairies, chefs), and residents, each more keenly aware of their food supply and their mutual dependence” (Delind 2006, 123, emphasis added). Follett (2009) argues that when you buy local food, you know the people who have produced the food. This means that you can trust that the food is healthy, and that it has been produced in a sustainable manner. Sonnino and Marsden (2006) argue that direct exchange encourages more active trust, in contrast to the unreflective passive trust that is cultivated through engagement with conventional food systems. But, if local food scales-up in ways that erode those direct connections (e.g. through corporate local food), then customers will not be able to have similar trust.

In reply, notice that this objection makes a strong empirical claim, i.e. that the best way to ensure that one’s purchases promote justice is to minimize the distance between one’s purchase and the effects of one’s market choices. I think that someone who makes this sort of objection has the burden to provide evidence that this is the case. The burden is on the advocate of (what I have called) epistemic communitarianism, since there is good reason to favor a presumption that direct connections are not necessary for knowing that justice is being done. Consider that we don’t usually think that ‘direct connections’ are optimal for other kinds of knowledge about justice (or safety). For example, I think that many people are committed to the just treatment of sanitation workers, but I assume that few people think is important that you get to know the people who pick up your garbage, in order to assess whether they are being treated justly. Similarly, few people think that they
ought to perform personal inspections of their local water utilities, in order to get the best knowledge they can about water safety. (But this is not because it is impossible to do so; my local water utility gives regular tours.) Instead, we generally rely on institutions to implement and enforce standards for justice and safety, and we aim our critical attention at these institutions. In the case of public utilities, we may focus our attention on public political institutions. In the case of AFNs, we may also focus our attention on the various institutions involved in the certification, labelling, and inspection of AFN practices.

**Political communitarianism**

Someone might also reject the sorts of compromises I’ve discussed because she believes that direct connections create forms of community life that are essential for food justice. Here, the idea is not (only) that direct connections are of epistemic value (for knowing that justice is being done), but that they partially instantiate justice. I call this a reason of political communitarianism. On this sort of view, one way in which contemporary food systems are unjust is that they cultivate alienation and disconnection among participants in our world’s overly-extended food networks. (Consider the existential dread some people feel upon entering large corporate grocery stores.) Food justice, therefore, includes the cultivation of relationships (and connections) between the various actors involved in these systems.

The claim that AFNs are valuable because they generate valuable forms of (political) community is a common refrain among advocates of AFNs. The view is present in Pollan (2007), Halweil (2004), Thompson (2010), Delind (2006), Venn et al (2006) and Sage (2003). In section three, I discussed the aesthetic values that one might promote through direct relationships with the people who produce one’s food. And it is not obvious how to demarcate between the merely aesthetic values of these relationships and the political values of these relationships. I suppose that getting clear about the location of this divide would require getting clear about the kinds and amounts of interpersonal and associational membership that justice requires. And that work – about what (if any) kind of communitarian theory of justice is correct – is far beyond the scope of this paper.

I think that the political communitarian makes a powerful objection to scaling up AFNs, and I’m not going to be able to adequately respond to this objection here (for the reason I just gave). But, by way of response, I will say this: Even if direct connections with one’s fellow community members are essential components of social justice, it does not follow that all of one’s relationships with others need to be direct connections in order for one’s community to be just. I can have direct
connections with only a very small number of people, perhaps numbering in the hundreds or low thousands. But surely I am in some kind of relationship with many more people than this, if we count all of those who are participants in the various forms of political and economic cooperation in which I am engaged. For example, I have an important relationship with my fellow citizens who live hundreds of miles away: We exercise coercive political power over each other. But I don’t think that it would make my society more just if (somehow) I were to have more direct relationships with many more of my fellow citizens. In a similar way, I stand in important relationships with people who produce and distribute my food. These relationships can be more or less just, but the directness of these relationships seems tangential (at best) to their justice. What matters most is whether I participate in the exploitation of these persons, whether they benefit from our relationship, whether our relationship leads them to work in safe conditions and to experience economic development in their broader communities. I have assumed, for the sake of this paper, that scaling-up AFNs could promote these goals of justice. This means that scaling-up AFNs could make my relationships with my fellow participants in global (and local) food systems more just, even while it makes these relationships less direct.

5 Anti-capitalist absolutism

Another reason for resisting changes to existing forms of AFNs may be grounded in an absolutist rejection of cooperation with large for-profit corporations. I think that this sort of resistance may take two main forms.

Slippery slope

First, one may be committed to worries about a slippery slope. Here, one may admit the possibility of short-term benefits from partnering with large for-profit agricultural corporations. One may accept that working with larger corporate producers, distributors, and retail sales operations could allow AFNs to take advantage of economies of scale – and that these economies of scale could lead to lower prices, greater market share and broader impact. The worry that motivates this objection is that partnering with large for-profit corporations starts one on a slippery slope towards complete corporate cooptation of one’s movement. What may start out with AFNs promoting food justice (with corporate cooperation) will inevitably end with corporate control of AFNs and a failure to promote substantial reforms.
Consider, for example, Delind’s claim that if we disconnect AFN food products from underlying community relationships, we will commodify AFN foods in ultimately self-defeating ways. She says that the choice[s] made by people who see themselves as wise consumers...will not withstand market forces. Without an emotional, a spiritual, and a physical glue to create loyalty, not to a product, but to layered sets of embodied relationships, local will have no holding power. It will be reconfigured by market rationality into new consumable products (Delind 2006, 125–6).

On Delind’s view, it is the direct connections in AFNs that make AFNs possible in the first place. If AFNs become just ‘ethical products’ within an otherwise unreformed corporate agricultural system, then there is no reason to think that people will remain committed to the underlying political goals of AFNs. The incentives of corporations – and the psychological weakness of individual consumers – will undermine the radical potential of AFNs.

I have two responses to this objection. First, someone offering this objection needs to make an empirical argument. He needs to provide convincing evidence that there exists a slippery slope between small-scale cooperation between AFNs and large corporations, on the one hand, and complete corporate cooptation of AFNs, on the other. In the absence of this empirical case, someone who raises this worry is making the slippery slope fallacy, since the mere fact that one has moved in the direction of corporate cooptation does not necessitate that one will end up there. Second, the evidence that would be sufficient to support this objection would need to show more than that there is a possibility that cooperation between AFNs and corporations will lead to corporate cooptation of AFNs. This is because the prospect of promoting food justice may justify taking a nontrivial risk that AFNs will be coopted by corporate interests. (Maximin is seldom a rational strategy; it would block most efforts to resist injustice.)

Revolutionary purity
A second version of anti-capitalist absolutism does not claim that cooperating with corporations leads inevitably to corporate cooptation. Instead, it claims that the ultimate goal of food justice movements (indeed, all justice movements) must be a world without capitalism. Among other things, this means a world without large for-profit corporations. And, according to this objection, there is a duty of justice not to act in ways that lend support to the capitalist system, even when doing so may be a means of mitigating harms. Note that two ideas come together to make this
objection: (1) food justice requires a world without capitalism and (2) we should promote justice (including food justice) by refusing to lend further support to current injustices. If AFNs are part of a revolutionary anti-capitalist struggle, and if this struggle needs to stay clear of existing capitalist institutions, then AFNs must not partner with large for-profit corporations. To do so is to make the same errors of which Karl Marx accused the socialists of his time: They compromised with capitalism in ways that inevitably prolonged the time at which communist revolution would arrive.

I have two responses to this objection. First, I worry that this objection is too utopian. Of course, ideas about justice are always utopian; they point to a better world than the one in which we live. But I think that ideas about justice ought to be realistically utopian, where this means that we have a reasonable idea about what the just world would look like and that we have a theory of politics, moral psychology, etc., by which we can explain how it is feasible to move from current conditions to a just world. I do not think that a post-capitalist world is realistically utopian in this way, especially if such a world would be one that lacked large for-profit corporations. (Of course, I lack the space to defend this claim here.) Regardless, a second response applies even if the first response fails: Even if anti-capitalism is realistically utopian, the ideal of a post-capitalist world tells us very little about how we must act now. In particular, ideas about a (nearly) perfectly justice society do not, by themselves, tell us how to respond to particular injustices in radically unjust circumstances, like those in which we live. To use the language of contemporary political philosophy, ideal theory is not very instructive for nonideal conditions. And, in particular, we often do better to aim to make our world a little less unjust than to act in ways that are more directly oriented towards perfect justice. In particular, I think it is likely better to scale-up Fair Trade by partnering with large corporations (with the result of improving the living conditions of many more of the developing world’s farmers and agricultural workers), than to abjure relations with for-profit corporations in order to make progress towards a world without capitalism.

6 Conclusion
I have discussed three kinds of reasons for resisting scaling up AFNs, if scaling up AFNs compromised more-direct connections between small farmers and individual consumers.

[I have run out of time. I promised William a copy of this paper by the end of the week and it’s now 11:55pm on Saturday.]
Bibliography


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1 For skepticism about the hope that locavorism can lead to significant drops in carbon emissions, see Singer and Mason (2007).
2 By a *pro tanto* reason, I mean one that weighs in favor of an action or belief, but that may be defeated by other considerations.
3 Raynolds (2012) quotes this from an earlier draft of FT USA’s *Fair Trade for All* statement that is no longer present on their webpage.
4 To be clear, these aesthetic values include much more than the taste of AFN foods. While some celebrate the good taste of these foods, local (seasonal) foods are not always tastier than imported foods (especially if the comparison is between local winter root vegetables and imported fresh fruits) (see, e.g. McKibben (2008), cited in Peterson (2013, 428–9).
5 Cite on G.A. Cohen and conservatism
6 Indeed, this claim long precedes existing AFNs, e.g. Goldschmidt (1978).
7 Here, contrast Rawls’s realistic utopianism about justice with Cohen’s ideas about justice, i.e. ‘even if it is not practical’.