Against the Inevitability of Human Chauvinism

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In our enlightened times, when most forms of chauvinism have been abandoned, at least in theory, by those who consider themselves progressive, Western ethics still appears to retain, at its very heart, a fundamental form of chauvinism, namely, human chauvinism. For both popular Western thought and most Western ethical theories assume that both value and morality can ultimately be reduced to matters of interest or concern to the class of humans.

Class chauvinism, in the relevant sense, is substantially differential, discriminatory, and inferior treatment (characteristically, but not necessarily, by members of the privileged class) of items outside the class, for which there is not sufficient justification. Human chauvinism, like other varieties of chauvinism, can take stronger and weaker forms; an example of the weaker form is the Greater Value Thesis, the invariable allocation of greater value or preference, on the basis of species, to humans, while not however entirely excluding nonhumans from moral consideration and claims.² We will be concerned primarily with strong forms of human chauvinism, which see value and morality as ultimately concerned entirely with humans, and nonhuman items as having value or creating constraints on human action only insofar as these items serve human interests or purposes.

In recent years, since the rise of the "environmental consciousness," there has been increasing, if still tentative, questioning of this exclusive concern with, or at least heavy bias toward, human interests; and indeed, at a time when human beings are rapidly accelerating their impact on the natural world, the question as to the validity of this basic assumption is not merely an abstract one, but is of immediate and practical concern in its implications for human action. In reply to this questioning (which appears to originate largely from people with environmental interests), modern moral philosophers—fulfilling their now established function of providing a theoretical superstructure to explain and justify contemporary moral sensibilities rather than questioning fundamental assumptions—tend to argue that the bias toward human interests, which is an integral part of going ethical theories, is not just another form of class chauvinism which it is both possible and desirable to eliminate, but is rather a restriction dictated by the logic of evaluative and moral concepts, and that there is no coherent, possible, or viable alternative to the "human chauvinism" of standard ethical theories. In this paper, we want to consider and reject a series of arguments in the theory of value designed to show that this is so and thereby to advance the cause of an alternative, nonchauvinistic, environmental ethic.

The orthodox defense of human chauvinism argues that it is inevitable that humans should be taken as the exclusive subjects of value and morality. Humans are uniquely and exclusively qualified for moral consideration and attributions of value, according to this defense either because the human species alone does, as a matter of fact, possess properties which are a precondition for such ascriptions or because, as a matter of the definition or the logic or the significance of moral concepts in natural language, such considerations are restricted as a matter of logic to the human species. In the first case the restriction of morality and value to the human species will be taken as contingent, in the second necessary. In either case, if the argument is correct, the bias in favor of humans in current theories is inescapable so that, depending on one's definition of chauvinism, either human chauvinism itself is inevitable, or human bias is, because justifiable, not a real chauvinism at all. We shall consider the logical or definitional approach first.

According to the definitional approach, moral and evaluative terms are, as a matter of their definitions, restricted in their application to members of the human species; only in a secondary way at best do such terms find a wider application, according as evaluated items are instrumental to human interests. The thesis is often backed up by the production of definitions which are so restricted, for example, "the value of a thing is its capacity to confer a benefit on someone, to make a favorable difference to his life," where in the intended context "someone" is obviously restricted to humans.

The attempt to preserve human chauvinism in an unchallengeable form through definitions involves the fallacy of taking definitions to be self-validating and unchallengeable, and appears to be based on the confusion of abbreviative definitions with those involving or presupposing substantive claims, such as creative definitions, which may be accepted or rejected. Such definitions as those above cannot be merely abbreviative because they attempt to characterize or explicate already understood terms, such as 'moral' or 'value'. Worse still, they do so in a way which is not dictated by prevailing usage—which does not require that moral and value terms be restricted in

range to humans in order that they continue to apply to humans in the ordinary way. Alternative definitions which do not so restrict the range of application may be supplied; they can in fact be found by looking up dictionaries, and these alternatives quite properly do not close off genuine issues which natural language itself leaves open.

The fallacy of the definitional move is that of believing that by converting the substantive evaluative theses of human chauvinism to matters of definition they become somehow exempt from challenge or need for justification. This is comparable to justifying discriminatory membership for a club by referring to the rules, similarly conceived as self-validating and exempt from question or need of justification. Since a similar move could obviously be employed to limit membership of the Moral Club to, say, white male humans in place of humans generally, it is plain that such a definitional argument does far too much and is capable of use to produce completely unacceptable conclusions.

But of course substantive theses involved in definitions, like club rules, are not exempt from challenge and may be arbitrary, undesirable, restrictive, and in need of justification. Once this is grasped the definitional move can be seen as entirely question begging, since the question of the acceptability and inevitability of human chauvinism is simply transformed into the question of the acceptability and inevitability of the definition. The production of such human chauvinist definitions has done nothing to advance the case of human chauvinism other than to throw a spurious air of unchallengeability and necessity over the highly challengeable and arbitrary substantive theses they embody.

The attempt to settle substantive issues "by definition" is both philosophically facile and methodologically unsound and is especially so when there are clearly alternative definitions which would not settle the issue in the same way. What, however, of the substantive claim presupposed by the definitional move, namely, that as a matter of natural language usage, or the logic of moral and evaluative concepts, the meaning of moral and value terms, it is logically necessary that direct, noninstrumental application of such terms be restricted to the human (a claim made at least in the case of rights by Ritchie,3 and subsequently by Passmore,4 and by others). But usually, when it is asserted that nonhumans cannot have rights, obligations and such like, what sort of "cannot" is involved is not specified—whether it is a "cannot" of logical impossibility, or of non-significance or absurdity, or something else again (the point is nicely illustrated by Feinberg's discussion of McCloskey,5 and by McCloskey himself.6 In any case, however, the thesis appears to be mistaken, for it rules out as logically impossible or absurd a number of positions and theses which are very plainly neither and which it may even, in some circumstances, be important to consider. For example, it is surely neither impossible nor absurd to consider moral questions concerning conduct of humans toward other species, for example, to a race of sensitive and intelligent extraterrestrial beings, and similarly moral questions arising from their conduct toward or concerning humans; indeed science fiction writers do this commonly without producing nonsense or contradicting themselves. Not only does the proposed restriction appear quite mistaken given current usage, but there seems indeed to be something logically unsound about the attempt to place a logical restriction to a particular species on such terms, just as there would be in restricting membership of the Moral Club to people with blue eyes and blond hair who are over six feet tall. The accident of being a zoological human, defined in terms of various physical characteristics, cannot be morally relevant. It is impossible to restrict moral terms to particular species, when species distinctions are defined in terms of physical characteristics which are not morally relevant.

More generally, any attempt to derive a logically necessary connection between humanity itself and the applicability of morality is bound to fail. For creatures anatomically and zoologically distinct from humans which are identical with humans in terms of all morally relevant features are logically possible, upsetting any logical linkage. But attempts to establish a logical tie between humanity and morality through features which all and only humans possess and which are themselves linked logically to morality would, of course, involve a modal fallacy, namely, that of substituting a contingent equivalence within an opaque modal context of logical necessity. In order for such an argument to be valid, it would have to be logically necessary that nonhumans do not possess such features, not merely a contingent fact that they do not; but this assumption must be incorrect for morally relevant characteristics.

The only proposal which has a chance of succeeding, then, is the factual one which makes the selection of just humans for the Moral Club a contingent matter, the claim being that as a matter of contingent fact all and only humans possess a certain set of characteristics, which characteristics themselves are logically tied with qualification for moral consideration and for direct attribution of value to the possessor.

What this contingent form of human chauvinism has to produce then, in order to establish its case, is a set of characteristics which satisfy the following conditions of adequacy:

1. The set of characteristics must be possessed by at least all properly functioning humans, since to omit any significant group usually considered subject to moral consideration, such as infants, young children, primitive tribesmen, etc., and to allow that it was permissible to treat these groups in the way it is considered permissible to
treat non-humans, that is, as mere instruments, would certainly be repugnant to modern moral sensibilities and would offend common intuitions as to the brotherhood of man, the view that all humans are possessors of inalienable rights. Thus human chauvinism, if it is to produce a coherent theory which does not acceptably rule out some groups of humans, must find some set of features common to the most diverse members of humankind, from Rio Tinto executives to hunter-gatherer tribes of Amazonian Indians, from those who engage in highly abstract activities such as logic and mathematics to those who cannot, from the literate and cultured to the illiterate and uncouth, from the poet and professor to the infant. This alone will be no easy task.

2. In order for human chauvinism to be justified, this set of characteristics must not be possessed by any non-human.

3. The set of characteristics must be not merely morally relevant but sufficient to justify, in a non-circular way, the cut-off of moral consideration at exactly the right point. If human chauvinism is to avoid the charge of arbitrariness and unjustifiability and to demonstrate its inevitability and the impossibility of alternatives, it must emerge from the characteristics why items not having them may be used as mere instruments to serve the interests of those which do possess them. There must be some explanatory logical connection between the set of characteristics and membership of the Moral Club.

Chauvinists are always anxious to stress distinguishing points between the privileged class and those outside it—and there is no lack of characteristics which distinguish humans from nonhumans, at least functioning healthy adult ones. The point is that these distinctions usually do not warrant the sort of radically inferior treatment for which they are proposed as a rationale. On the basis of the characteristics, then, the proposed radical difference in treatment between the privileged and nonprivileged class and the purely instrumental treatment of the nonprivileged class, must be warranted, that is, the distinguishing characteristics must be able to carry the moral superstructure placed upon them.

A large and exceedingly disparate collection of features has been suggested as distinguishing humans from nonhumans and justifying human chauvinism. But it turns out that every one of these, on examination, either fails to pick out the desired privileged class of humans in an unequivocal fashion, that is, it applies to some nonhumans or excludes some humans who should not be excluded, or, when it does select the desired class, fails on condition 3 and does not warrant the exclusive claim to moral consideration of the privileged class. Many suggested criteria in fact fail on more than one count.

The traditional distinction between humans and the rest in terms of rationality illustrates the point. Once the theological doctrines of the exclusively human soul on which the distinction once rested are abandoned, it is not so easy to see what is meant by this term. Indeed it often appears to function as little more than a self-congratulatory predicate applied exclusively to humans, with no other clear function at all. However various clarifications are sometimes offered. For example rationality may be said to be the ability to reason, this being tested by such basically linguistic performances as the ability to do logic, to prove theorems, to draw conclusions from arguments and to engage in inductive and deductive linguistic behavior. But such stringent and linguistically loaded criteria will eliminate far too many members of the human species who cannot perform these tasks. If, however, behavioral criteria for rationality are adopted, or the ability to solve problems and to fit action to individual goals becomes the test—that is, practical reasoning is the test—it is obvious that many nonhuman animals will qualify for rationality, perhaps more easily than many humans. But in either case the distinction fails on condition 3, for why must the ability to perform such tasks be the criterion for admission to the Moral Club rather than the ability to perform some other tasks or meet some other set of standards, such as orienteering ability, or the ability to mix concrete (the use of concrete being, after all, a far more conspicuous feature of modern human society than the use of reason)? One senses also in the appeal to such criteria (and especially to linguistic criteria) the overvaluation of the things in which the privileged class typically excels and the under-valuation of the skills—not obviously, in any noncircular way, inferior—of the nonprivileged class, which is such a typical feature of chauvinism.

We list some of the suggested characteristics supposedly justifying human chauvinism and indicate in brackets after each some of the conditions they fail: using tools (fails 1, 2, 3); altering the environment (1, 2, 3); possessing intelligence (2, 3); the ability to communicate (1, 2, 3); the ability to use and learn language (1, 2, 3); the ability to use and learn English (1, 3); possession of consciousness (2, 3); self-consciousness or self-awareness (1, 2?, 3); having a conscience (1, 2?, 3); having a sense of shame (1, 2?, 3); being aware of oneself as an agent or initiator (1, 2, 3); having awareness (2, 3); being aware of one’s existence (1, 2?, 3); being aware of the inevitability of one’s own death (1, 2?, 3); being capable of self-deception (1, 3); being able to ask questions about moral issues such as human chauvinism (1, 3); having a mental life (2, 3); being able to play games (1, 2, 3); being able to laugh (1, 3); to laugh at oneself (1, 3); being able to make jokes (1, 3); having interests (2, 3); having projects (1, 2, 3); being able to assess some of one's
performances as successful or not (1, 2, 3); enjoying freedom of action (2, 3); being able to vary one's behavior outside a narrow range of instinctual behavior (1, 2, 3); belonging to a social community (1, 2, 3); being morally responsible for one's actions (1); being able to love (1, 2); being capable of altruism (1, 2); being capable of being a Christian, or capable of religious faith (1, 3); being able to produce the items of (human) civilization and culture (1, 3).

It appears that none of these criteria meets the conditions of adequacy; furthermore it seems most unlikely that any other characteristics or any combination of these characteristics does so. Thus we conclude that these contingent direct arguments for human chauvinism do not establish its inevitability and that indeed the position rests on a shaky base and so far lacks a coherent theoretical justification.

Human chauvinism cannot be restored by a detour through the concept of a person, that is, by linking personhood with membership of the Moral Club and identifying the class of persons contingently with the class of humans. For then the same problem as above arises with different terminology since, even if the notion of person can be specified in such a way as to justify the restriction of moral privileges to persons, the class of persons will then not coincide (even approximately) with the way human chauvinism requires with the class of humans, but will either include a great many nonhumans or exclude a good many humans normally morally considered.

Attempts to enlarge the privileged class—for example, to persons (broadly specified)—or to sentient or preference-having creatures may avoid many of the problems of arbitrariness and justification which face the strong form of human chauvinism, but, as we shall argue, it will face a set of problems of coherence and consistency common to all instrumentalist theories of value and morality.

II

There are a number of indirect arguments for human chauvinism based on features of value and morality. We turn now to consider these. One abstract argument which is supposed to establish that values are, or must be, determined through the interests of humans or persons—a central argument underlying chauvinism—takes the following form:

A. Values are determined through the preference rankings of valuers (the no detachable values assumption).

B. Valuers’ preference rankings are determined through valuers’ interests (the preference reduction thesis).

C. Valuers are humans [persons] (the species assumption).

D. Therefore, values are determined through human interests [through the interests of persons].

Hence, it is sometimes concluded, not only is it perfectly acceptable for humans to reduce matters of value and morality to matters of human interest, but moreover there is no rational or possible alternative to doing so; any alternative is simply incoherent.

Although this argument does not, so far as we are aware, appear anywhere with its premises explicitly stated, it does seem to reflect the sorts of consideration those who claim that there is no rational or coherent alternative to organizing everything in human interests usually have in mind. Of course once the premises are exposed, it is easier to see that this initially persuasive argument, like others in the area, rests on fallacious assumptions. We shall claim that although the argument to conclusion D is formally valid—given only some quite conventional assumptions such as that the relation of determination or functionality is appropriately transitive and the principle of replacement of necessary identicals—not all the premises should be accepted.

The argument can be treated as the major representative of a family of similar arguments. For there are many variations that can be made on the argument with a view to amending it, tightening it, varying or strengthening its conclusion, and so on. Our criticisms of the argument will, for the most part, transfer to the variations. A first group of variations replaces or qualifies the determining relation; for example, “determined through” or “determined by” may be replaced by “answer back to,” “reflect,” “are a matter of,” “can be reduced to,” or “are a function of.” (The latter functional form makes it plain that “determined” has to mean “exactly determined,” which ensures that no extraneous factors enter into the chauvinistic determination; mere partial determination would be quite compatible with the rejection of human chauvinism.) Alternatively, “determined” may be modally upgraded to “have to be determined” in order to reveal the sheer necessity of conclusion D. (In this case, it is essential that premise C be of modal strength and not merely contingent, as it would be if the original form were retained; otherwise the argument would contain a modal fallacy.)

Another familiar, and appealing, variation we have already bracketed into the form of the argument given; namely the replacement of humans as base class by persons. This straightforwardly increases the cogency of premise C, which otherwise—while better than, say, “Valuers are white (North American) humans”—would at best be contingently true (which is not good enough for the argument and in fact appears false, since some valuers may not be human; and certainly not all humans are valuers), while at worst it is simply a circular way of reintroducing the logical version of human chauvinism by
restricting the class of valuers a priori to humans. That all valuers are persons may be made analytic on the sense of "person"—given a redefinition of "person"—away from its normal English usage, which philosophical English appears almost to tolerate—thus shielding premise C from criticism. Other base classes than persons can replace humans in premise C—for example animals—thus leading to the conclusion, of animal chauvinism, that values are determined through the interests (considerations and concerns) of animals, sentient creatures, or whatever. In the end, of course, premise C could be absorbed (as, for example, valuers are valuers or valuing creatures) and accordingly omitted, leaving the conclusion: Values are determined in the interests of valuers. However even the analytic form of premise C does not, as we shall see, save the argument.

Much the same applies in the case of premise A. The premise is certainly not unobjectionable in the usual sense of 'determined'; but there are ways of repairing it so that the argument still works in a sufficiently damaging form, and one way goes as follows: What is true, analytically, if sufficiently many valuers are taken into account, is that values are determined through the value rankings of valuers. Value rankings cannot however be cashed in for preference rankings since, as is well-known, preference rankings and value rankings can diverge; a valuer can prefer what has less value and can value what is not preferred. Let us amend the argument then—so that we can locate the real cause of damage—by replacing premise A by the following premise:

A. Values are determined through the value rankings of (appropriate) valuers. Correspondingly, B will be adjusted to B 1 in which "value" replaces "preference."

The really objectionable premise in the central argument is neither premise A nor premise C, but premise B—or, more exactly, where A is repaired, premise B 1 . Suspicion of premise B may be aroused by noticing that it plays an exactly parallel role in the class chauvinism argument to that the critical premise BE. One's preferences or choices are always determined through self-interest.

plays in familiar arguments for egoism, that whatever course of action one adopts, it is always really adopted in one's own selfish interest. The argument for egoism runs along the following, parallel, lines:

AE. Individual persons [agents] always act (in freely chosen cases) in the way they prefer or choose, i.e. in accordance with their preference rankings.

BE. Individual preference rankings are always determined through [reflect] self-interest.

Therefore:

DE. Individual persons [agents] always act in ways determined by self-interest [that reflect their own interests].

Thereafter follows the slide from in their own interests to to their own advantage or for their own uses or purposes. The final conclusion of egoism, again paralleling the class chauvinism case, is not only that the egoistic position is perfectly in order and thoroughly rational but that there are no alternatives, that there is, or at least ought to be, no other way of acting, "that men can only choose to do what is in their own interests or that it is only rational to do this."

Thus human chauvinism, as based on the central argument, stands revealed as a form of group selfishness, group egoism one might almost say. Likewise, the criticisms of the Group Selfishness argument, as we shall now call the central argument, parallel those of egoism; in particular premise B (B 1 ) succumbs to similar objections to those that defeat premise BE (BE 1 ). Group selfishness is no more acceptable than egoism, since it depends on exactly the same set of confusions between values and advantages, and slides on such terms as 'interests', as the arguments on which egoism rests. Nowell-Smith's very appealing critique of egoism may, by simple paraphrase, be converted into a critique of group selfishness. This is obvious once we recast B 1 and BE 1 and set them side by side:

BE 1. Individual value rankings are determined through [individual] self-interest.

B 1. Valuers [groups'] value rankings are determined through valuers' [group] interests [joint interests of groups].

Because, however, one sets up or selects one's own preference or value rankings, it does not follow that they are set up or selected in one's own interests; similarly in group cases, because a group determines its own rankings, it does not follow that it determines them in its own interests. Just as BE 1 is, prima facie at least, refuted by a range of examples where value, and also preference, rankings run counter to self-interest, e.g., cases of altruism, so prima facie at least, B 1 is refuted by examples where value, and also overall preference rankings, vary from group interests, e.g., cases of group altruism. In the case of limited groups, examples are easy to locate, e.g., resistance movements, environmental action groups, and so on; in the case, however, of the larger human group, examples are bound to be more controversial (since B 1 unlike BE 1 is a live thesis), but are still easy to find, especially if future humans are discounted; e.g., it is in humans' selfish interests to have plentiful supplies of this and that, electricity from uranium, oil, whalemeat, fish, etc., right now rather than the more limited supplies which would result from
restraint, but altruistic value rankings would rank the latter above the former. It is often in selfish human interests (no less selfish because pertaining to a group) to open up and develop the wilderness, strip mine the earth, exploit animals, and so on, but environmentalists who advocate not doing so, in many cases not merely because of future humans, are apparently acting not just out of their own or human group interests.

But, just as BE₃ is not demolished by such counterexamples of apparently altruistic action, neither is B₃; in each case it can be made out that further selfish interests are involved; e.g., in the case of B₁, that an agent did what he did, an altruistic action, because he liked doing it. As Nowell-Smith explains in the egoism case, interest is written in as an internal accusative, thereby rendering such theses as BE₃ true at the cost, however, of trivializing them. More generally, valuing something gets written in as a further sort of "interest"; whatever valuers value that does not seem to be in their interests is said to provide a further interest, either the value itself or an invented value surrogate; for example, the environmentalist who works to retain a wilderness he never expects to see may be said to be so acting only because he has an interest in or derives benefit or advantage from just knowing it exists, just as he would be said to be acting in the egoist case. By such strategies the theses can be retained; for then a valued item really is in valuers' interests, in the extended sense, even if they are in obvious ways seriously inconvenienced by it, that is, even if it is not in their interests in the customary sense. Thus, B₃, like BE₃, is preserved by stretching the elastic term "interest," in a way that it too readily admits, to include values, or value surrogates, among interests. Then however the conclusion of the Group Selfishness argument loses its intended force and becomes the platitude that values are determined through valuers' values, just as egoism, under the extension which makes us all covert egoists, loses its sting and becomes a platitude. It can be seen that human chauvinism in this form, like egoism, derives its plausibility from vacillation in the sense of "interest," with a resulting fluctuation between a strong false thesis—the face of human chauvinism usually presented—and a trivial analytic thesis, between paradox and platitude.

To sum up the dilemma for the argument then: when "interest" is used in its weaker sense premise B may be accepted but the argument does not establish its intended conclusion or in any way support human chauvinism. For the intended effect of the argument in the crude form is this: in determining values it is enough to look at human advantage; nothing else counts. If the argument were correct, then one could assess values by checking out the local (selfish) advantage of humans, or, more generally, the advantage of the base class somehow assembled. If, on the other hand, "interest" is used in its strong sense, the conclusion would license a form of human chauvinism, but premise B now fails.

Most philosophers think they know how to discredit the egoist arguments. It is curious indeed then, that an argument which is regarded as so unsatisfactory in the individual case—that for egoism—remains unchallenged and is still considered so convincing in a precisely parallel group case—that for human chauvinism.

III

The Group Selfishness argument is often employed in another way, as the presentation for a choice between the conclusion D, that value is determined by or reducible to a matter of human interests, and the denial of premise A, which denial is seen as entailing a commitment to a detached, intrinsic, or naturalistic theory of value. Thus, it may be said either one accepts the conclusion, with its consequent instrumentalist account of value, or one is committed to an intrinsic or detached value theory which takes values to be completely independent of valuers, and no way determined by them. But, it is assumed, the latter theory is well known as untenable, and may even be seen as involving mysticism or being irrational. Thus, it may be concluded, there is no real coherent alternative to such an instrumental account of value, and hence no real alternative to human chauvinism.

The form of the argument then, is essentially: ~ A ∨ D, but A, therefore D—or, if a stronger connection, of intensional disjunction, is intended: ~ D → ~ A, but A, therefore D. It can be seen that the main premise, ~ A ∨ D, has resulted from the exportation and suppression of premises B and C of the Group Selfishness argument. This suppression does nothing to improve the standing of the premises although it does have the (possibly advantageous) effect of making it more difficult to see the fallacious assumptions on which it is based. For of course the choice presented, ~ A ∨ D, is a false one, and for precisely the same reasons that led us to say that premise B was false. To reject the instrumentalist conclusion D is by no means to be committed to A, or to the view that the valuers and their preference rankings play no role in determining values, and that values are a further set of mysterious independent items in the world somehow perceived by valuers through a special (even mystical and nonrational) moral sense. Valuers' preference rankings may be admitted to play an important role in evaluations; we are still not committed to D unless we assume—what amounts to premise B—that these preference rankings reflect, or can be reduced to, valuers' interests.

The dichotomy frequently presented between instrumentalist accounts of value, on the one hand, and detached theories (or what are mistakenly taken to be the same, intrinsic theories) is, for the same reason, a false one. Instrumental theories are those which attempt to reduce value to what is instrumen-
tal to or contributes to a stated goal. Typically such theories take the goal to be the furtherance of the interest of a privileged class; for example, the goal may be taken to be determined in terms of the interests, concerns, advantage, or welfare of the class of humans, or of persons, or of sentient creatures, depending on the type of chauvinism. In particular, human chauvinist theories are, characteristically, instrumentalist theories. In contrast, an item is valued intrinsically where it is valued for its own sake, and not merely as a means to something further; and an intrinsic-value theory allows that some items are intrinsically valuable. Intrinsic theories then, contrast with instrumental theories, and what “intrinsic” tells us is no more than that the item taken as intrinsically valuable is not valued merely as a means to some goal, i.e., is not merely instrumentally valued. Accordingly detached value theories, since disjoint from instrumental theories, are a subclass of intrinsic value theories; and they are a proper subclass since intrinsic values need not be detached. Something may be valuable in itself without its value being detached from all valuing experience. It is evident, furthermore, that the identification of intrinsically and detached value theories presupposed in the argument is no more than a restatement of the false dichotomy \( \sim A \vee D \), or \( \sim D \to \sim A \), i.e., noninstrumental, therefore detached. The assumption that if preference or value rankings are involved at all the resulting assignments must be instrumental is either false or is a variation of the fallacious premise B which plays a crucial role in the Group Selfishness and Egoist arguments. The variation is that if value or preference rankings are involved they must reflect valuers' interests; therefore such values are instrumental because the items valued are valued according as they reflect valuers' interests; and therefore according as they are a means to the end of satisfying the valuers' interests. It follows that intrinsic value theories may allow for a third way between instrumental and detached theories because of the possibility of value rankings (and also preference rankings) which are not themselves set up in a purely instrumental way, that is, attributing value to an item only according as it is a means to some goal.

The argument that there is no coherent alternative to instrumentalism does not, however, rely just on misrepresenting alternative intrinsic accounts as logically incoherent by assimilating them to detached accounts. It also trades on a contemporary insensitivity to the serious logical and epistemological problems of instrumental accounts of value, problems which were well known to classical philosophers (see e.g., Aristotle, *Metaphysics* 994b9–16). It does not appear to be widely realized that the classical arguments apply not just to a few especially shaky instrumentalist theories which adopt questionable goals but to instrumentalism in general, since they assume only quite general features of the instrumentalist position.

Instrumentalist positions take as valuable (or in the moral case, as creating moral constraints) just what contributes to a stated end. An obvious example which comes to mind is utilitarianism. However, in the more general case we are concerned with, of instrumentalist forms of human chauvinism, there may be a set of goals, not just a single goal such as that of maximizing net happiness of humans; the human-chauvinist assumption is that the values (indeed constraints) are goal reducible, and that all goals reduce in some way to human goals, or at least can be assessed in terms of human concerns and interests. Human chauvinist positions are not necessarily instrumental, but those that are not (e.g., the position that just humans and nothing else are intrinsically valuable) tend to make the arbitrary chauvinistic nature of their assumptions unwisely explicit—most successful contemporary chauvinisms being covert ones.

Problems for instrumentalism arise (as Aristotle observed) when questions are asked about the status of the goal itself. Instrumentalism relies entirely for its plausibility upon selecting a set of goals which are widely accepted and are, in the theory, implicitly treated as valuable. It relies at bottom on an implicit valuation which cannot itself be explained in purely instrumental terms. Of course, a value assumption is not eliminated in this fashion; it is merely hidden under the general consensus that such a goal is appropriate, that such an end is valuable. But the strategy of successful instrumentalism is to avoid recognition of the fact that the goal is, and indeed must be, implicitly treated as valuable, by selecting a set of goals so much part of the framework of contemporary thought, so entrenched and habitual as a valued item by humans, that the value attached to the goal becomes virtually invisible, at least to those within the framework. Thus it is with the assumption of human chauvinist instrumentalism that goals are exclusively determinable in terms of human interest. The basic, convincing and self-evident character of this assumption rests on nothing more than the shared beliefs of the privileged class of humans concerning the paramount and exclusive importance of regarding their own interests and concerns, on a valuational assumption or goal which is "self-evident" because it is advantageous and is habitual. The consensus features, of which instrumentalists make so much, are nothing more than the consensus of the privileged class about the goal of maintaining their own privilege, that is, a consensus of interests. This sort of agreement of course shows very little about the well groundedness of the position.

Unless the goals set are widely accepted as valuable, the account will be unconvincing to those who do not share the goal and even to those who appreciate that it is possible to reject the goal. In order for instrumentalism to work logically however, the goal must be implicitly treated within the theory as valuable, for otherwise the proposed analysis loses explanatory and justificatory power and lacks compulsion. For how can the value of an item be explained and justified in terms of its contribution to an end not itself consid-
ered valuable? Serious problems also arise about the nature of value statements under the instrumentalist analysis unless the goal is treated as valuable. For if the goals themselves are not so treated within the theory, but are taken simply as unevaluated facts, then a valuational statement "x is valuable" becomes, under the proposed analysis, simply the statement that x tends to produce a certain result, to contribute to certain human states, a statement whose logical status, openness to verification, allowance for disagreement, and so on, does not substantially differ from the statement that x tends to produce ferric oxide, to contribute to the rusting of human products. Such an account of value statements is open to the same sort of objections as other naturalistic reductions of value, for example, Mill's account of the desirable in terms of the desired. The special logical and epistemological character of value statements then, especially with respect to verification and disagreement, must be supplied in instrumentalism, if it is to be supplied at all, by the implicit treatment of the goal itself as valuable.

The fact that the goal of an instrumental account must be taken as itself valuable gives rise to two choices. In the first, the goal is taken as itself instrumentally valuable, which creates an infinite regress. For if the end, reason, or assignment for which other items are instrumentally valuable is itself only instrumentally valuable, then there must in turn be some other end, reason, or assignment in terms of which it is valuable (by definition of instrumental). A regress is thus begun, and if this regress is not to be viciously infinite, it must terminate in some end or feature which is taken as valuable just in itself, that is, with intrinsic values.

On the alternative option, the goal is not taken to be instrumentally valuable but is admitted to be valuable in some other way. Unless an "except" clause is added to the original instrumentalist account so that all values are held to be instrumental with the exception of the goal, the account will of course be contextually inconsistent, since it is inconsistent when contextually supplied assumptions are added. For these include the assumption that the goal itself is valuable, but not in the way that the instrumentalist thesis claims the only way possible. Thus the goal is taken to be both valuable and not valuable.

If, on the other hand, an "except" clause is added, this amounts to an admission that the goal is taken to be noninstrumentally valuable. Thus the account may be able to retain consistency, but does so at the expense of explicitly admitting a value, that of the goal, which cannot be accounted for in purely instrumental terms; in short, the goal is taken as intrinsically valuable.

To sum up, the dilemma for the instrumentalist can be put as follows: Consider the desirability of the goal of the instrumental theory; it must implicitly be judged to be desirable, for otherwise nothing could be justified by reduction to it. Ask: Is this goal also instrumentally desirable (valuable) or not? If it is, i.e., it is only desirable as a means to a further goal, then either a regress is initiated or the same issue arises with respect to the new goal. But if it is not, then the instrumental theory is again refuted, since the goal is desirable though not desirable according to the test of the theory because it is not instrumental to the goal.

Whichever horn of the dilemma is taken, then, the outcome is the same: The instrumentalist must rely on treating the goal itself as implicitly valuable in a way not purely instrumental, that is, as intrinsically valuable. Thus the instrumentalist is, at bottom, guilty of precisely the same crime of which he accuses the adherent of an intrinsic account, with the added delinquency of failing to admit and face up to his basic assumptions. The logical and epistemological position of such an instrumental account is certainly no better than that of an intrinsic account, since there is logically no difference between the recognition of one intrinsic value (or one set in the case where goals are multiple) and the recognition of many of them, and the logical and epistemological status of the instrumentalist's account is no better than that of the goal to which his values are taken as instrumental. Since the instrumentalist has implicitly admitted the legitimacy of an intrinsic value assignment in setting up his account, he cannot claim any superiority over a more general intrinsic theory which allows for many intrinsic values, since what is legitimate in the case of one value assignment must be equally legitimate in the multiple case.

This abstract dilemma for human-chauvinist instrumentalism is illustrated in a concrete case by Passmore's procedure in Man's Responsibility for Nature; for Passmore (1) wishes to say that there is no coherent alternative to instrumental values, that an item is valuable insofar as it serves human interest, and (2) wants to explain the unique value attributed to humans in terms of their production of valuable civilized and cultural items. But (2) involves the admission of values, that of civilized items, which cannot be valuable in the way (1) states, and indeed (2) amounts to the admission of noninstrumental values. The proposed account is inconsistent because if intrinsic values are admissible in the case of civilized items, they cannot be logically incoherent in the way (1) claims.

The sort of problem faced by Passmore is however not a readily avoidable one for the instrumentalist; if for the charge of arbitrary and unjustifiable human chauvinism is to be avoided by those who opt for (1), and humans are not themselves to be awarded intrinsic values—thus conceding the logical legitimacy of intrinsic values generally, and hence the avoidability of human chauvinist accounts of value—some explanation must be provided for the exclusive value attributed to humans. But any explanation capable of justifying this valuation in a nonarbitrary and nonchauvinistic way would have to
refer to properties of humans and would have to say something like: "Humans are uniquely valuable because they alone have valuable properties \(x, y, z, \ldots\) or produce valuable items A, B, C, \ldots." The list of proposed distinguishing features already considered above is usually what will be employed here. But this is to admit intrinsic value for the properties which explain the exclusive value of humans. The dilemma for the human chauvinist is that he must either take the exclusive human-value assumption (the goal) as ultimate—laying him open to the charge of arbitrary chauvinism and of attributing intrinsic values to humans—or attempt to explain it—in which case he will again end by conceding noninstrumental values.

Thus the case for the inevitability of human chauvinism, that alternatives to it must be based on an incoherent and logically and epistemically defective account of values, namely a noninstrumental account, has not been established by these arguments.

IV

Egoism, not group selfishness, is one of the assumptions underlying the next series of abstract defenses of chauvinism. The leading ideas of the representative argument we first consider are essentially those of social contract theories. This argument takes the following form (the bracketed parameters \(X\) and \(Z\) are filled out in the representative argument respectively by: "justification of moral principles," and: "enter into contracts"):

J. The only justification of moral principles [only \(X\)] is a contractual one, i.e., the entry into contracts of agents \([Zy]\).
K. Agents only enter into contracts [only \(Z\)] if it serves their own interests. (The egoist assumption)
L. Humans [persons] are the only agents that enter into contracts [that \(Z\)].

Therefore, by K and L: M. Humans [persons] only enter into contracts [only \(Z\)] if it serves their own interest.
Therefore, from J and M: N. The only justification for moral principles [only \(X\)] is the (selfish) interests of humans [persons].

The argument can be varied by different choices of parameters, \(X\) and \(Z\). For example, \(X\) could be filled out by "determination of value judgments," and "contractual" replaced by "community-based" (i.e., \(Z\) is filled out by "are community-based" or some such) yielding in place of J the familiar premise that the only justification of value judgments is a community-based one, and leading to a conclusion, analytically linked to D above, that all value judgments are determined by human self-interest. Alternatively, just one of \(X\) or \(Z\) may be so replaced, leaving the other as in the original example. Another variation of the argument that has figured prominently in the discussion of animal rights fills out \(X\) and \(Z\) respectively by "determination of rights" and "belong to human society." Under this assignment, the parametric premise J becomes essentially that commonly adopted statement\(^{15}\) (already criticized above) that rights are determined solely by reference to human society.

As the arguments are in each case valid, the issue of the correctness of the conclusions devolves on that of the correctness of the premises. In each case too, the arguments could be made rather more plausible by replacing "humans" by "persons" (and correspondingly "human society" by "society of persons", etc.); for otherwise premises such as L and its variations are suspect, since there is nothing, legally or morally, to prevent consortia, organizations, and other nonhumans from entering into contracts (and these items are appropriately counted as persons in the larger legal sense). Given that amendment to premise L, the correctness of the arguments turns on the correctness of premises J and K. But both these premises are false and premise J imports the very chauvinism that is at issue in the conclusion.

Though the representative contract argument is only one of several important variations that can be made on the general parametric argument, it is often regarded as having special appeal, because the contract model appears to explain the origin of obligation, and offer a justification for it, in a way that no other model does, and appears thus to provide a bulwark against moral, and political, scepticism. That the appearance is illusory, because the obligation to honor contracts is assumed at bottom, is well enough known and not our concern here. What is of concern is the correctness of representative premises J and K.

The egoist assumption K is faulted on the same grounds as egoism itself. For agents sometimes enter into contracts that are not in their own interests but are in the interests of other persons or creatures, or are undertaken on behalf of, for instance to protect, other items that do not have interests at all, e.g., rivers, buildings, forests. The attempt to represent all these undertakings as in human interests, because done in the "selfish interests" of the agents, is the same as in the egoist arguments, and the resolution of the problem is the same, namely, to distinguish acting, valuing, and so on, clearly from acting in one's own selfish (or in-group) interests. However even if premise K were amended to admit that agents may enter into contracts on behalf of nonhuman items, it would still result in a form of human chauvinism given familiar assumptions, since nonhuman items will still be unable to create moral obligations except through a human sponsor or patron, who will presumably be able to choose whether or not to protect them. Natural items
there is no actual contract underlying the principle that one ought not to be

recognized of those moral principles that cannot be contractually based so that

responsible parties. If they can be freely undertaken there must be a choice

explained as contractually based, at least if "contract" is to be taken seriously.

There is no actual contract underlying the principle that one ought not to be
cruel to animals, children, and others not in a position to contract. Adherents
of a social contract view of moral obligation are of course inclined to withhold
recognition of those moral principles that cannot be contractually based so that
the contract thesis becomes not so much explanatory as prescriptive. But even
allowing for this, the thesis has many unacceptable consequences just con-
cerning humans, and if the notion of contract plays a serious role, it is difficult
to reconcile with the view of all humans as possessing rights.

A crucial feature of contracts is that they are freely undertaken by
responsible parties. If they can be freely undertaken there must be a choice
with respect to them—the choice of not so contracting. But then we are left
with the conclusion that it is permissible to treat those who do choose not to
contract as mere instruments of those who do, in the way that the nonhuman
world is presently treated; these contractual dropouts, like those outside soci-
ety, can have no rights and there can be no moral constraints on behavior
concerning them, whatever their capacity for suffering. A similar conclusion
emerges if humans who are not morally responsible are considered, for al-
though we are normally thought to have quite substantial obligations to such
humans, e.g., babies, young children, those who are considered mentally ill
or as having diminished responsibility, they cannot themselves be free and
responsible parties to a contract and will, on the social contract view, presum-
ably have to depend for their rights on others freely choosing to contract on
their behalf. If, for some reason, this does not occur we will be left with a
similarly unacceptable conclusion as in the case of the contractual dropouts.
Obviously then, moral obligations do not require morally equal, free, and
responsible contracting parties, in the way the social contract account presup-
poses. Worse, the argument would appear, with but little adaptation, to justify
the practices of such groups as death squads, multinational corporations, and
the Mafia, or any other group that contracts to protect the interests of its own
members.

If these unacceptable conclusions are to be avoided, all humans will
have to be somehow, in virtue of simply being human, subject to some
mysterious, fictional, social contract which they did not freely choose to enter

into, cannot get out of, and which can never exclude any member of the
human species. So the unacceptable consequences are avoided only if crucial
features of the notion of contract such as freedom and responsibility are
dropped, and the notion of contract and premise J so seriously weakened as to
become virtually without conditions. For the argument to work the residue has
to be mere common humanity, and the "contract" little more than the conven-
tion of morally considering just other members of the human species. Such a
convention differs little however from a restatement of human chauvinism; the
preferred explanation is really no explanation, for such a convention can
neither justify human chauvinism nor, since different conventions could be
arranged, explain why it is inevitable.

The social contract account of moral obligation is defective because it
implies that moral obligations can really only hold between responsible moral
agents and attempts to account for all moral obligation as based on contract.
But of course the account is correct as an account of the origin of some types
of moral obligation; there are moral obligations of a type that can only hold
between free and responsible agents and others which only apply within a
social and political context. Yet other types of obligation, such as the obliga-
tion not to cause suffering, can arise only with respect to sentient or
preference-having creatures—who are not necessarily morally responsible—
and could not significantly arise with respect to a nonsentient such as a tree or
a rock. What emerges is a picture of types of moral obligation as associated
with a nest of rings or annular boundary classes, with the innermost class,
consisting of highly intelligent, social, sentient creatures, having the full range
of moral obligations applicable to them, and outer classes of such nonsentient
items as trees and rocks having only a much more restricted range of moral
obligations significantly applicable to them. In some cases there is no sharp
division between the rings. But there is no single uniform privileged class of
items, no one base class, to which all and only moral principles directly apply,
and moreover the zoological class of humans is not one of the really signifi-
cant boundary classes. The recognition that some types of moral obligation
only apply within the context of a particular sort of society, or through
contract, does nothing to support the case of human chauvinism.

The failure of the contract theory nevertheless leaves the issue as to
whether there is some logical or categorial restriction on what can be the
object of moral obligations, which would reinstate human chauvinism or
animal chauvinism. There is, however, no such restriction on the object place
of the obligation relation to humans or sentient creatures. Even if the special
locution "Y has an obligation toward X" requires that X is at least a
preference-having creature, there are other locutions which are not so re-
stricted, and one can perfectly well speak of having duties toward land and of
having obligations concerning or with respect to such items as mountains and
rivers, and without necessarily implying that such moral constraints arise only in an indirect fashion. Thus neither natural language nor the logic of moral concepts rules out the possibility of nonsentient items creating direct moral constraints.

There is then, given this point and the annular model, no need to opt for the position of Leopold as the only alternative to human (or animal) chauvinism, that is, for a position which simply transfers to natural items the full set of rights and obligations applicable to humans, leading to such nonsignificance as that rocks have obligations to mountains. Distinctions between the moral constraints appropriate to different types of items can be recognized without leading back to human chauvinism. The point is an important one since many objections to allowing moral obligations to extend beyond the sphere of humans, or in some cases the sphere of sentient creatures, depend on ignoring such distinctions, on assuming that it is a question of transferring the full set of rights and obligations appropriate to intelligent social creatures to such items as trees and rivers—that the alternative to chauvinism is therefore an irrational and mystical animism concerning nature.

The ecological restatement of the strong version of human chauvinism, according to which items outside the privileged human class have zero intrinsic value, is the Dominion thesis, the view that the earth and all its nonhuman contents exist or are available for man’s benefit and to serve his interests and, hence, that man is entitled to manipulate the world and its systems as he wants, that is, in his interests. The thesis indeed follows, given fairly uncontroversial, analytic assumptions, from the conclusions of the main chauvinistic arguments examined, notably D, that values are determined through human interests. The earth and all its nonhuman contents thus have no intrinsic value, but at best have instrumental value and so can create no direct moral constraints on human action. For what has only instrumental value is already written down, in this framework as serving human interests. And since what has no instrumental value cannot be abused or have its value diminished, it is permissible for humans to treat it as they will in accord with their interests. Therefore, the Dominion thesis. Conversely, if nonhuman items are available for man’s use, interests and benefits, they can have no value except insofar as they answer his interests. Otherwise there would be restrictions on his behavior with respect to them, since not any sort of behavior is permissible as regards independently valuable items. Accordingly value is determined through man’s interests, that is, D holds. Thus the Dominion thesis is strictly equivalent to D. It follows that the Dominion thesis, like D, strictly implies human chauvinism. Conversely, the strong version of human chauvinism strictly implies D, and so the Dominion thesis, completing the sketch of the equivalence argument. Since the positions are equivalent, what counts against one also counts against the others. In particular, then, the Dominion thesis is no more inevitable than, and just as unsatisfactory, as strong human chauvinism.

The upshot is that the dominant ethical systems of our times, those clustered as the Western ethic and other kindred human chauvinistic systems, are far less defensible, and less satisfactory, than has been commonly assumed, and lack an adequate and nonarbitrary basis. Furthermore, alternative theories are far less incoherent than is commonly claimed, especially by philosophers. Yet although there are viable alternatives to the Dominion thesis, the natural world is rapidly being preempted in favor of human chauvinism—and of what it ideologically underwrites, the modern economic-industrial superstructure—by the elimination or overexploitation of those things that are not considered of sufficient instrumental value for human beings. Witness the impoverishment of the nonhuman world, the assaults being made on tropical rainforests, surviving temperate wildernesses, wild animals, the oceans, to list only a few of the victims of man’s assault on the natural world. Observe also the associated measures to bring primitive or recalcitrant peoples into the Western consumer society and the spread of human-chauvinist value systems. The time is fast approaching when questions of our times, and perhaps the most important questions that human beings, whose individual or group self-interest is the source of most environmental problems, have ever asked themselves.

NOTES

1. This thesis has, among other unacceptable outcomes, the consequence that, if there is only room in one’s boat for one and one must choose between saving Adolf Hitler and a wombat which has lived a decent and kindly life and never harmed a living creature, one is morally obligated to choose the former. That would not be the choice of the authors.

7. This feature typifies a number of rather circular distinguishing characteristics, or at least ones which raise serious theoretical problems for human chauvinism because they attempt to explain the unique value of humans in terms of their ability to produce items which are taken to be independently valuable, thus contradicting human chauvinism. (See the discussion in V. Routley, "Critical Notice of Passmore, *Man’s Responsibility for Nature*," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 53 [1975]: 177.)
8. There is nonetheless an esoteric, semantical, sense of "determined" in which premise A is demonstrably true, and so a sense in which it is analytically true that value rankings are semantically determined by the preference rankings of situations by a class of valuers. The details of these semantical foundations for values are set out in R. and V. Routley, "Semantical Foundations for Value Theory," *Nous* (forthcoming). But while premise A can be corrected by replacing "determined" by "semantically determined" and giving this an appropriate construal, such a move would do nothing to restore the intended argument; for it would either invalidate the argument, through change in the key middle term "determined," or, alternatively, if "determined" is systematically replaced throughout the argument, drastically alter the intended conclusion D—so that looking at the interests that humans in fact have would now no longer provide a guide to values (instead the interests of hypothetical valuers with respect to worlds that never exist would have to be gathered).
10. Ibid., pp. 140-44.
11. The technique of rescuing philosophical theses by natural extensions and accompanying redefinitions of terms, including the thesis "We’re all selfish really," is delightfully explained in J. Wisdom, *Other Minds* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1952), ch. 1.
13. Value rankings can be semantically analyzed in terms of preference or interest rankings, as in R. and V. Routley, "Semantical Metamorphosis of Metaphysics," *Australasian Journal of Philosophy* 54 (1976) explains. The semantical foundations, while conceding nothing to subjectivism or instrumentalism, make it easy to concede main points of the case (attributed to Dewey) against detached values, against the view that there are values somehow out there (in Meinong’s *assen- sein*), purely naturalistic values completely detached from all valuers, or from all preference rankings of valuers. Put differently, there are no values that do not somehow answer back to preference rankings of valuers, and so no values that are entirely detached from valuers and valuational activity such as preference-ranking of situation. But the answering back is made explicit and precise by the semantical analysis, not by any syntactical reduction or translation of value statements into statements about valuers’ preference or interest rankings; and the valuers of the analysis are, like the situations introduced, ideal and need in no way exist. As a result then, valuations may be independent of the aggregated preference rankings of all actual humans or, for that matter, of all persons over all time. Thus too the semantical analysis makes it easy to navigate a course between the alternatives of two influential false dichotomies, to the effect that values are either instrumental or else detached, or that values are either subjective or else detached. For though a semantical analysis can be given, upsetting the detached value thesis, no translation or syntactical reduction of the sort subjectivism assumes is thereby effected.
14. The logical transitions in the argument take on more evidently valid form upon analytic transformation of the premises, to those now illustrated:
   J’. All justifications of moral principles are cases of (justified by) the entry into contracts of agents.
   K’. All cases of the entry into contracts are cases of self-interests of agents.
   And so on for L’ through M’.
15. See notes 3 and 4 above.
18. This view encompasses what Passmore has isolated as the Western environmental ideologies, both the dominant view and the lesser traditions; see V. Routley, "Critical Notice of Passmore, *Man’s Responsibility for Nature*."

\[\text{R. and V. Routley}\]