This newsletter is intended to serve as a postscript to my recent papers on eco-philosophy - "Anthropocentrism and the Environmental Crisis" (AEC) and "Panpsychism vs. Modern Materialism" (PMM) - and to provide an updated bibliography for those reading and writing in eco-philosophy. I would be happy to supply an initial mailing list for anyone interested in continuing the "informal newsletter" tradition. But perhaps the time is ripe for an eco-philosophy journal. Any prospective editors?

"Pythagoras and Empedocles, men of no ordinary attainments but scholars of the first rank, assert that there is a single status of justice belonging to all living creatures. They proclaim, moreover, that everlasting punishment awaits those who have wronged anything that lives." ("Philus" in Cicero's dialogue De re publica, c. 51 B.C., Bk. III. Quoted in John Rodman's "The Nature of Right and the Right of Nature")

"In some way or another all things are in man, and therefore to the extent that he dominates what is in himself, to the same extent it falls to him to dominate other things." (St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica 1a, 96, 2-Quoted in John Rodman's paper mentioned above)

"I may mention another fundamental error of Christianity, an error which cannot be explained away, and the mischievous consequences of which are obvious every day: I mean the unnatural distinction Christianity makes between man and the animal world to which he really belongs. It sets up man as all-important, and looks upon animals as merely things...Christianity contains in fact a great and essential imperfection in limiting its precepts to man, and in refusing rights to the entire animal world." (Arthur Schopenhauer, Religion: A Dialogue and Other Essays, trans. by T. B. Saunders, Allen & Unwin, 1890, p. 112. Quoted in John B. Cobb, "The Hierarchy of Rights")

1. Spinoza and Ecophilosophy. E.W.F. Tomlin, in his popular work, The Western Philosophers (Perennial Library, 1963, p. 146), claims that "the most remarkable fact about Spinoza is that although he was personally the most aloof and isolated of beings, his chief aim was to show how men could make the universe their home and acquire a feeling of kinship with all its creatures." Spinoza was not all that aloof and isolated (he had his circle of friends and students). To the extent that he was isolated, his lifestyle was dictated, in part, by prevailing socio-political religious circumstances. But more to the point, Tomlin's characterization of his chief aim, although perhaps a widely-held opinion, is, alas, much too simplistic. In suggesting Spinoza as a "patron saint" for Western eco-philosophers, I over-looked a passage in Hampshire's Spinoza (Penguin, p. 76) which is, in some respects, crucial:

Spinoza, like Descartes, showed an unsentimental and unEnglish disregard of the soulfulness of animals; they both held that we are entirely justified in exploiting them for our own purposes.

The relevant passages in Spinoza's works were graciously pointed out to me by both Wallace Matson (UC Berkeley) and Robert McShea (Boston Univ) (TP II-8 and Ethics, Pt. 4, Prop 37 Sch. 1; Part 4, App. par. 26).
In the *Ethics*, Spinoza says,

> it is plain that the law against the slaughtering of animals is founded rather on vain superstition and womanish pity than on sound reason. The rational quest of what is useful to us further teaches us the necessity of associating ourselves with our fellowmen, but not with beasts, or things, whose nature is different from our own; we have the same rights in respect to them as they have in respect to us. Nay, as everyone's right is defined by his virtue, or power, men have far greater rights over beasts than beasts have over men. Still I do not deny that beasts feel: what I deny is, that we may not consult our own advantage and use them as we please, treating them in the way which best suits us; for their nature is not like ours, and their emotions are naturally different from human emotions.

And further, Robert McShea's interpretation of Spinoza ("Spinoza on Power," *Inquiry*, Vol. 12, 1969, pp. 133-43) makes a very strong case for placing his system squarely in the camp of the Western 17th century anthropocentric power-over-nature theorists:

> All the power of an individual is for his own good...human power is for human good...Man's power is his ability to convert God's or Nature's energy to his own purposes. God or Nature is thus 'value-free', the appropriate arena for value-free science...Human power is exerted against the resistance of internal and external alien circumstances. Spinoza follows the philosophic tradition in his central concern with man's power over himself, over his internal chaos. He departs from that tradition and reveals himself as a true modern believer in progress and in the liberating mission of natural science when he treats of man's power over external nature...The more we understand the processes of nature, the better we can exploit the system and energies of the natural world to gain advantage and avoid trouble and death. Spinoza shared with Machiavelli the thought that the physical world, veiled as a woman is and as unsettlingly capricious, could yet be tamed, that man could be master in his own worldly home. Spinoza was gentler than some, who would torture Nature to reveal its secrets...Spinoza's thought is a significant step in the historical process of the demystification of God and of Nature, of that conversion of the world into a Gesellschaft which is the necessary condition for the later successful aggressions of business and applied natural science. But he valued science because it promised a more secure and pleasant existence, an existence which includes time for reflection and self-realization. Progress meant for him an increase in the security of that man who is on the road to salvation and the opening of that road to many men who might otherwise never have dreamed of it... (For Spinoza) natural science is a human power.

Marx Wartofsky, another Spinoza admirer, also seems to endorse essentially this interpretation of Spinoza when he writes that "liberating reason, therefore, is what gives man autonomy, domination over nature...Mastery over nature (as dumb nature, i.e., as natural forces without will) does not turn a 'free' nature into an 'unfree' nature. Nature is neither free nor unfree, it just is" (Is Science Rational?" in Truitt & Solomons, *Science, Technology and Freedom*, Houghton Mifflin, 1974, pp. 202-10).

Spinoza's expedient attitude toward the treatment of other species is clear and unmistakable; here he is surely a child of prevailing 17th century European views. But at the same time he also held the view that other species exist for their own sake, and in this view he was no doubt influenced by Maimonides:
Ecophi1osophy 3

The Egyptian-Jewish Saadia, writing in the tenth century A.D., committed himself very firmly to the view that "the entire universe was created on account of man." The greatest Jewish orthodox philosopher, Maimonides, at first took the same view in his early commentary on the Mishnah. "All things in the sublunary world, he there writes, "exist only for the sake of man." But he later rejected that view as in essence profoundly non-Jewish. Genesis makes it perfectly clear, he then argues, that the world was good before man was created. "It should not be believed", he concludes, "that all beings exist for the sake of the existence of man. On the contrary, all the other beings, too, have been intended for their own sakes and not for the sake of something else" (John Passmore, Man's Responsibility for Nature, p. 12).

Apparently, the influence of Maimonides' views upon Spinoza was not sufficient to overcome the dominant European anthropocentric planetary bias. Spinoza's non-anthropocentric cosmology was based upon the most influential sciences of the time (astronomy and physics); these sciences were also, incidentally, the basis of the non-anthropocentrism of Russell and Einstein. The pre-biological nature of Spinoza's philosophy seemed to preclude the extension of his non-anthropocentrism fully to the planet Earth, although his conceptualizations, when carried through to their logical conclusion, would seem to allow for a biosystems approach to understanding man and his place in the planetary environment (see PMM pp. 19ff.).

In the civilized West, the reemergence of first an appreciation and then a more complete understanding of biological processes and systems had to await the Romantics, Darwin, and finally Aldo Leopold and the ecologists. One has a strong suspicion that thoroughly citified people who have not immersed themselves in large hunks of relatively unaltered nature for any length of time are not likely to develop a very profound ecological sense of things. As Leo Marx has pointed out ("American Institutions and Ecological Ideals," Science, Vol. 170, 27 Nov 1970, pp. 945-52), a sense of ecology has developed most easily in those steeped in the writings on Thoreau's woods, Melville's oceans, Twain's rivers, and, one might add, Muir's mountains (Marx's paper, incidentally, is a masterpiece and deserves to be read carefully along with his The Machine in the Garden. While pointing to the almost mystical sense of the interrelatedness and attachment to the landscape of the great American nature writers, their criticism of extreme urbanization as in many ways contrary to human nature, and the essential rootless dynamism of American culture, his paper also consists of a beautifully constructed historical critique of American technological society and of the implicit collusion of the scientific establishment and individual scientists with this system. Many of Marx's themes, however were voiced long ago (1911) in a now-neglected paper by the philosopher, George Santayana, "The Genteel Tradition in American Philosophy" as a swan song to America and what he took to be odious in American philosophy and culture. Another literary approach to the environment is Joseph Meeker's The Comedy of Survival. Meeker has served for several years as the environmental editor of the North American Review. Many fine papers by Meeker and others appear in the back issues as well as several of the papers presented at the conference on "The Rights of Non-Human Nature").

One contemporary philosopher and Spinoza scholar who feels that Spinoza's system lends itself to an environmental restructuring is Arne Naess. Naess recently resigned his Chair of Philosophy at the University of Oslo to devote more time to environmental problems. Further, he qualifies as one who has spent time in unaltered Nature - he is described as having an "International reputation as an alpinist". In his recent work which, unfortunately for the layman, is extremely technical (Freedom, Emotion and Self-Subsistence: The Structure of a Central Part of Spinoza's Ethics, Universitetsforlag 1975), he says,
Some of the (predicates used by Spinoza), for instance self-preservation and power, are applied not only to humans, but to animals and perhaps to all living things...We cannot doubt that animals have feelings (sentire), Spinoza says in 3P57Sch. They have emotions (affectus). But their joys (gaudium) are different from those of human beings. Their drives are different, the differences being greater than those between humans. Here Spinoza not only talks about mammalia, but also of fish and insects... There is, in short, nothing in the Ethics to stop us in our attribution of all the introduced predicates to living beings 'down' to insects... For his philosophy, I think we must recognize that the maximal range of application of the predicates is essential:

All particular things are expressions of God; through all of them God acts. There is no hierarchy. There is no purpose, no final causes such that one can say that the 'lower' exist for the sake of the higher. There is an ontological democracy or equalitarianism - which, incidentally, greatly offended his contemporaries, but of which ecology makes us more tolerant today. However generous in his attributions, the range of a predicate such as 'virtuous' or 'in harmony with what is rational', cannot meaningfully be applied to the beings of the mineral kingdom. But we find it unfruitful to draw a line at any particular place (pp. 118-19).

Two other important recent papers by Naess are "The Place of Normative Ethics Within a Biological Framework" in Breck and Yourgrau, Biology, History and Natural Philosophy, and "The Shallow and the Deep Ecology Movements", Inquiry, Vol. 16, No 1, Spring 1973 - reprinted in Struhl and Struhl, see below).

Perhaps the most serious challenge to an ecological interpretation of Spinoza's philosophy is that expressed by McShea and implied by Wartofsky. McShea would have Spinoza espousing a rather thoroughly modern secular anthropocentric doctrine of man's rightful exploitation of the biosphere. Nature has no value in and of itself, as Wartofsky would have it: Nature is dumb - "it just is". But this interpretation leaves it a mystery why Spinoza would equate Nature and God and why he would speak of the "intellectual love of God". Spinoza's evaluation of scientific knowledge as preparing the way for the contemplative intuitive mystical vision of Nature sub specie aeternitatis seems at variance with McShea's pragmatic interpretation of the value of science to Spinoza. And the passages quoted from Hampshire (PPM pp.16,20) give the impression that Hampshire and McShea are talking about two totally different philosophers. Interpretations of Spinoza's intentions and, as a consequence, what his system will allow in terms of modification, are admittedly notoriously difficult. At this point, I can do no more than leave this business to Hampshire, Matson, McShea, Naess, and other Spinoza scholars, to sort out. As a final point however, one might point out that Spinoza's conception of Nature as possessing infinite attributes of which humans can know only two - thought and extension, seems to express a profound humility before the cosmos (on this point, see the last chapter of E.M. Curley, Spinoza's Metaphysics).

For an interesting discussion of Spinoza's mysticism, see H.G. Hubbeling, "Logic and Experience in Spinoza's Mysticism," in J.G. vanderBend, Spinoza on Knowing, Being, and Freedom, Van Gorcum & Comp., The Netherlands, 1974. Errol Harris (Philosophy, Northwestern Univ.) has recently written an easily read exposition of Spinoza's philosophy (Salvation from Despair: A Reappraisal of Spinoza's Philosophy, M. Nijhoff, 1973). He tells us that "implicit in Spinoza's thought is the essential solution to the ultimate issues distracting our era (among these being that) the extinction of the race within the foreseeable future seems threatened from every quarter, whether by the exhaustion of the resources of the earth, or by the pollution of the sea and its life-giving waters, or by the destruction of the ecological systems in which living
species cooperate to maintain themselves and one another." However, I could find few places in the book where Harris explicitly attempts to relate Spinoza's thought to these problems. Wallace Matson has just written a most challenging book which develops a theory of mind along Spinozistic lines (Sentience, UC Press, 1975).

2. The Mechanists and the Organicists. The sections of the paper PMM dealing with the mechanist-organicist controversy in biology were written somewhat in haste at the invitation to respond to Charles Birch's paper. And underlying the discussion of this controversy in this particular context was the ontological opposition of panpsychism and materialism as candidates for a sound man-nature metaphysic. In retrospect, it seems that organicism vs. reductionism, viewed as an ontological thesis, quite likely presents us with a false dichotomy. In response to the recent "offensive" mounted by the organicists (see e.g., Smythies & Koestler, Beyond Reductionism) Theodosius Dobzhansky called a conference of biologists and philosophers of science to discuss these issues in September 1972 at Villa Serbelloni, Italy. These papers, subsequently published in F. Ayala & T. Dobzhansky, Studies in the Philosophy of Biology, UC Press, 1974, seem to represent the best and most definitive thinking on this subject at the present time. Incidentally, Dudley Shapere's criticisms of the panpsychic ideas expressed by Birch and Rensch at the conference are well-taken (pp. 256-8

For various reasons, it becomes increasingly difficult to see materialism, idealism, panpsychism, and the rest as ultimate or "rock-bottom" categories of reality. In this sense, the pragmatists and Heidegger were correct in rejecting this mode of ontologizing as legitimate, although the emphasis of the pragmatists upon a thoroughly non-contemplative rationale for developing conceptual schemes seems too narrow. The fact that these various metaphysical theses continue to reappear in new contexts and to have a persuasive influence on thinking tends to indicate that each line of thought contains some legitimate human experience to which it is calling attention. In other words, Kant's claim that the ding-an-sich exists unknowable behind the appearances must be taken seriously and is not to be identified (ala Sellars) with the hypothetically ultimate entities of physics. Jack Smart has recently argued that "to see the world sub specie aeternitatis is to see it apart from any particular or human perspective. Theoretical language of science facilitates this vision of the world...its laws can be expressed in tenseless language. Moreover, it contains no words for secondary qualities, such as colors, which though in a sense perfectly objective are of interest only because of the specific structures of the perceptual mechanisms of Homo sapiens (J.J.C. Smart, "My Semantic Ascents and Descents", in Bontempo & Odell, The Owl of Minerva: Philosophers on Philosophy, McGraw-Hill, 1975, p. 68). One can agree with Smart (and with Spinoza) that theoretical science facilitates this vision while still admitting that theoretical conceptual schemes are nevertheless human schemes for understanding reality; as Heidegger would express it, one more way in which "Being discloses itself".

We are back again with Spinoza's claim that Nature has infinite attributes most of which are inaccessible to humans. As Stuart Hampshire has recently expressed this idea ("A Statement About Philosophy", Bontempo & Odell, The Owl of Minerva, p. 100).

Spinoza thought of human beings as greatly limited in their powers to grasp and survey the natural order which must outrun their powers of perception and of understanding. His philosophy is by implication a polemic against anthropocentrism as much as it is a polemic against Christianity and Judaism. He does not represent human intelligence as a not unnatural and not utterly discontinuous elaboration of structures found elsewhere in nature; and he always insists that our perceptual apparatus and our intelligence cannot exhaust the infinite variety and extent of nature.
On a planetary scale, this sounds very much like the claims by ecologists that "Nature is not only more complex than we think, but it is more complex than we can ever know thus effectively putting the lie to "stewardship" views which see man as the "manager of the biosphere".

This view of reality would seem to parallel the ontological speculations of Henri Bergson. Our fatal and unavoidable epistemological anthropocentricity consists of the necessity of placing grids (conceptual schemes) upon reality or Being. James Christian (Philosophy, Rinehart, 1973, pp. 158-9) describes Bergson's view well:

The grid is only a mental tool for organizing our experience...What remains when all the mind's "grids" are turned off? Reality - unmeasured, undivided. A continuum of matter in motion and a consciousness of time undisturbed...Our minds, says Bergson, can indeed "move through" all the pragmatic grids and intuit the nature of reality itself. By a sort of "intellectual empathy" we can come to know the ever-changing, endlessly moving continuum which is reality. But to do this we almost have to tell the intellect to cease and desist in its persistent habit of reducing the universe to discrete, manageable units. To know what the real world is like, therefore, we must turn off the grid lights and let the stars shine. Reality is, and that is all.

3. The Subjective Digression. The ontological positions of materialism and the variants of idealism were arrived at historically largely depending upon whether the philosopher began with an "outside-in" or an "inside-out" point of departure, respectively (for a discussion of Matson's distinction between the two positions, see AEC p. 8). Although this distinction must ultimately be transcended (and I think Spinoza does exactly that), a purely inside-out approach has led to subjectivism and an indefensible anthropocentric cosmology. Idealism, subjectivism, and pragmatism, however, do point to the truth that all conceptual schemes are necessarily human. But the overemphasis upon this point has been the bane of European philosophy since Descartes. A clearly stated critique of the subjectivist approach appears in James Feibleman's The New Materialism (Nijhoff - The Hague, 1970) where he argues:

The prevailing Greek view of man ... was a view taken from the outside, and man himself a figure in a natural landscape. The modern scientific view of man is consistent with this Greek view. But modern European philosophy from its start took a different turn. Most of the European philosophers sought to look at man from the inside, as a figure quite distinct from his background and not an integral part of it. I call this European view "the subjective digression" because it occurs after the Greeks and despite modern science (p. 3).

In a chapter on the compatibility of materialism with a religious view of the cosmos, Feibleman argues that, "a materialist version of mysticism is possible on the basis of what we know about matter and have learned to do with it. Mystical materialism is able to justify religious feelings. We do not have to go beyond the material universe, then, in order to account for religious responses. As with Spinoza, the spiritual can be provided for without designating a special category" (p. 170).

Exhaustive references to those philosophers who are attempting to develop an outside-in descriptive epistemology (a "Copernican epistemology", in A. Shimony's terminology, in which man is viewed as "a small part of a large world rather than as the creator and centre of a phenomenal world") are discussed in Donald Campbell's "Unjustified Variation and Selective Retention in Scientific Discovery" in Ayala & Dobzhansky, Studies in the Philosophy of Biology, pp. 139ff.
Incidentally, a paper by G. Montalenti, "From Aristotle to Democritus via Darwin: A Short Survey of a Long Historical and Logical Journey" in Ayala and Dobzhansky traces the continuity of Greek science and modern science much as in AEC p. 4ff.

The subjective development of Western philosophy and the implications of this for the environmental crisis was the topic of a paper given at the APA meeting in Berkeley last month by Michael Zimmerman (Philosophy, Newcomb College, Tulane Univ.) entitled "Technological Culture and the End of Philosophy". The paper drew its inspiration from Heidegger's analysis of Western philosophy which also closely parallels John Cobb's analysis (see AEC). Excerpts from Zimmerman:

According to Heidegger, philosophy is identical with the subjectivist-metaphysical thinking which began with Plato and ended with Nietzsche. This kind of thinking is said to have made possible the technological world, in which all entities are assessed according to their ability to increase man's drive to more power...Heidegger believes that metaphysics (philosophy) began not with the pre-Socratics, but with Plato. For Plato transformed the pre-Socratic view of Being (as self-emerging and self-sustaining "presence") into the first form of subjectivism. Philosophy proper begins with this subjectivistic turn...Descartes' thinking is pivotal for modern subjectivism, but what he accomplished was possible only within the horizon opened by Plato. Descartes' achievement is to make the human Subject, the ego cogito, the absolute standard by which to judge the truth and reality of all things...Nietzsche's thinking, which is only the furthest unfolding of Descartes' discovery, marks the entrance into the age in which man interprets his own needs as absolute and views the entire Universe as raw material to be consumed in the satisfaction of those needs...Nietzsche is the last metaphysician and the last philosopher, according to Heidegger, because the history of philosophy has ended with man's achievement of his goal of absolute domination, at least potentially. The freedom which was the aim of Western thinking is achieved as the freedom to dispose of the earth in the way man desires. Heidegger sees philosophy as a Western phenomenon; only Western man's thinking has ended up by viewing the world as a storehouse of raw material for the enhancement of man's Power...But if Heidegger says that philosophy has ended, he does not say that thinking has ended. Indeed, fundamental thinking about man's Being has not yet even begun. Just what form this new kind of thinking must take, if it is to pass beyond the subjectivist thinking of philosophy-science-technology, is not clear. But Heidegger indicates that the new way must "let beings be," i.e., it must let them manifest themselves in their own presence and worth, and not merely as objects for the all-powerful Subject.

This sort of thinking in Heidegger points to an exciting non-anthropocentric point-of-view. Zimmerman's paper has not yet been published however he might be willing to send copies upon request.

4. Lynn White and Animal Liberation. Lynn White, Jr. (History, UCLA), author of the now classic "Historical Roots of the Ecologic Crisis", has rarely replied in public to criticisms of his thesis. One such exchange, however, featured Alan Watts and White discussing the relative merits of Eastern and Western approaches to the man-nature relationship at a public lecture sponsored by Esalen in San Francisco in January, 1971. I was fortunate to be in attendance (A commercial tape is available of this exchange - "Ecological Crisis: Religious Cause and Religious Solution" as well as a tape by Allen Watts, "Ecology and Religion" from Pacifica Tape Library, 5316 Venice Blvd., L.A. 90019)
White has also replied to criticism in a volume edited by Ian G. Barbour, Western Man and Environmental Ethics (Addison-Wesley, 1973). White's paper, "Continuing the Conversation" is certainly worth reading. In it he maintains a healthy non-anthropocentrism and, by the way, provides an implicit critique of those "animal liberationists" who feel that a mere resurrection of the old Benthamite utilitarian formulation which would extent rights to all sentient beings is sufficient ethical salve for our culture. Excerpts from White:

After my 1967 article appeared, a distinguished professor of forestry wrote to me: "We save redwood groves because people enjoy them. If St. Francis thought we should save them for squirrels, then he was preaching a religion for squirrels, not for men." I could only reply that St. Francis worshipped a God who was the God both of squirrels and of men...Yet a man-nature dualism is deep-rooted in us, as the letter from the professor of forestry shows. Until it is eradicated not only from our minds but also from our emotions, we shall doubtless be unable to make fundamental changes in our attitudes and actions affecting ecology. The religious problem is to find a viable equivalent to animism.

During the past few generations, kindness to animals (as distinct from pets) has become a virtuous sentiment in Western culture. It is now widely regarded as Christian, although there is little or no basis for it in the Christian tradition. The Save the Redwood League and similar groups have been extending kindness from animals to vegetables. Albert Schweitzer's concept of 'reverence for life' continues to spread. But is it only to living creatures that we should be kind?...More and more of us are inclined to think that we should have a decent respect for our living fellow creatures, although the arguments are usually prudential: if we damage the biotic system, won't it produce a backlash that will hurt us? We should ask whether a prudential ethic can rightly be called an ethic. Isn't it simply a rule of enlightened self-interest to be junked if feared results cannot be shown to occur?

The problem grows if we ask "Do people have ethical obligations toward rocks?" To an ancient Greek, to an American Indian, or perhaps to certain kinds of Buddhists, the question would have meaning. For quite different reasons they would probably reply "Yes," and the replies would reflect not prudential ethics but their ideas about the nature of reality. But today to almost all Americans, still saturated with ideas historically dominant in Christianity (although perhaps not necessarily so), the question makes no sense at all. If the time comes when to any considerable group of us such a question is no longer ridiculous, we may be on the verge of a change of value structures that will make possible measures to cope with the growing ecologic crisis. One hopes that there is enough time left (pp. 62-3).

Barbour's anthology contains a number of worthwhile papers by Leo Marx, Lewis Moncrief, a statement of the Benedictine stewardship views of Rene Dubos, and a little-known but enlightening paper by the ecologists, Murdoch and Connell, "All About Ecology" in which they stress the "non-managerial" nature of ecological knowledge. Barbour has also edited another religious ecology anthology, Earth Might Be Fair (Prentice-Hall, 1972) which contains a very nice paper by Huston Smith, "Tao Now: An Ecological Testament".

As for the "animal liberationists", led largely by the Australian philosopher Peter Singer, the current version of this movement seems to have got its start from Singer's paper "Animal Liberation" (NY Review of Books, Apr 5, 1973) which was a review of Godlovitch & Harris, Animals, Men and Morals. The movement contains vegetarians, anti-vivisectionists, and others associated with the Humane Society and seems to be
concerned largely with the way pain is inflicted unnecessarily upon feed-lot animals, copped-up chickens, laboratory animals, and hunter's targets (for another discussion of this in a slightly different context, see the appendix to T. Roszak's The Making of a Counterculture). I am sure that these theorists would find the predatory activities of hunter-gatherers a pure abomination (compare their writings with those of Paul Shepard and Gary Snyder). While their concerns are certainly legitimate and reflect the man-nature malaise of modern Western culture, they hardly strike at the roots of the Western man-nature problem as outlined by White above (see also PMM p. 13 and fn 35, 38). However, the writings anthologize well in the prevailing humanistically-oriented ethics texts. Singer has recently expanded his argument to a full-length book, Animal Liberation (which incidentally has already provided grist for a protest of the primate center at UC Davis) and has co-edited with Tom Regan, Animal Rights and Human Obligations (Prentice-Hall, 1976). The most interesting paper I find in this collection is Mary Midgley's "The Concept of Beastliness" in which she attempts to educate philosophers to some basic genetics and ethnology. The whole issue of an innate human nature and the genetic basis for human behavior has recently reemerged in force. One of the most recent and best of this genre is The Imperial Animal by Rutgers anthropologists, L. Tiger & R. Fox. Also to be mentioned is P. Shepard's The Tender Carnivore and the Sacred Game. And the attempt to ground basic ethics in human nature is also being reexplored from a genetic base. This seems to be what Hampshire is hinting at in his "Morality and Pessimism". In this context see also T. Dobszansky, "Ethics and Values in Biological and Cultural Evolution" (Zygon, Vol 8, 1973, pp 261-81) and his unpublished paper, "Evolutionary Roots of Family Ethics and Group Ethics" which I was privileged to discuss with him just before his death this December. A very important addition to this growing literature is E.O. Wilson's Sociobiology (Harvard Univ. Press, 1975). The storm raised by Wilson's thesis is fairly discussed by Nicholas Wade in Science, 19 March 1976, pp. 1151-55.

5. Current EcophiIosophy Papers. The paper, "Is There an Ecological Ethics?" (see PMM fn 64) by Holmes Rolston III (Philosophy, Colorado State Univ) has apparently attracted considerable interest from diverse sources. Rolston has also written other fine papers which intricately blend a detailed knowledge of ecology with mystical insight:
"Lake Solitude: The Individual in Wilderness" (Main Currents, Mar 1975 Vol 31 No 4);
"Hewn and Cleft from this Rock" (Main Currents, Jan 1971 Vol 27 No 3) and "Philosophical Aspects of the Environment" (P.O. Foss, Environment and Colorado, 1974).

Stephan White (Philosophy, E. Tenn State Univ) has edited Population and Environmental Crisis (E. Tenn Univ Press, 1975) which has a number of good papers including one by Pete Gunter (Philosophy, N. Texas State Univ) "The Rural Southern Mentality and the Environmental Crisis." For another interesting paper by Gunter see PMM fn 40.

Hwa Yol Jung (Political Science, Moravian College) has written "To Save the Earth" (to appear in Philosophy Today, 1975) which seems to combine a Heideggerian approach to nature and technology with Eastern philosophy. Jung has also written "The Paradox of Man and Nature" (Centennial Review, XVII, Winter, 1974); "The Ecological Crisis: A Philosophical Perspective, East and West" (Bucknell Review, XX Winter, 1972); "The Splendor of the Wild: Zen and Aldo Leopold" (Atlantic Naturalist, XXIX Spring, 1974).

J. Donald Hughes (History, Univ of Denver) has written "The Ancient Roots of Our Ecological Crisis" (National Parks & Conserv. Magazine, Oct 75) in which he claims that "Theophrastus was the only ancient Greek to grasp ecology in anything like the modern sense of the word, but his writings were eclipsed by those of his more famous teacher, Aristotie. (Theophrastus' most ecological work, On the Causes of Plants, has never been published in English)." For more on Theophrastus, see my AEC p. 5 and the reference to Clacken's work, Traces on the Rhodian Shore.
Hughes has also published *Ecology in Ancient Civilizations* (Univ of N. Mex Press, 1975).

Thomas Colwell Jr (Educ. Philosophy, N.Y. Univ) has published "The Ecological Basis of Human Community" (Educational Theory, Vol 26 No 4 1971) and a most amazing paper "Baker Brownell's Ecological Naturalism and Its Educational Significance" (Jl. of Educational Thought, Vol 9 No 1). According to Colwell, Brownell (a philosopher at Northwestern) has developed a complete social philosophy based upon ecological principles (Brownell, *The Human Community*, Harper & Row, 1950!) While suspicious of the linear relational thinking of science, Brownell's solution to "retaining concreteness within the very scheme of ecological relationships" was to move to mysticism. "For Brownell, mystical experience is a special awareness of the unity present in concrete situations of life. Unlike traditional otherworldly mysticisms, Brownell's is a mysticism of the here and now, a secular mysticism."

George Clark (Philosophy, Lafayette College) has also written some good papers in ecophilosophy: "The Scope of the Community" (Filosofia, Anais do VII Congresso Interamericano de Filosofia, Vol 2 Sao Paulo, 1974); "Humanism, Technology, Naturalism" (Proceedings of the XVth World Congress of Philosophy, Vol 3, Sofia, 1974); "Integrated Knowledge and Integrity" (Proceedings 7th Value Conference at SUNY, Geneseo, 1972) and most recently an unpublished paper "Dewey and Environmental Problems" which attempts to respond to the criticisms of Dewey in AEC.

6. Philosophy Texts and the Environment. As Wallace Matson points out, "great philosophy is reflection after the fact; it is the effort of thoughtful men to make sense of the world once again after the old picture has become no longer believable" (A History of Philosophy, Van Nostrand, 1968, p. 263). And now that the environmental crisis has made a shambles of the liberal industrial-technocratic world-view and value system, standard introductory philosophy texts, especially anthologies, are beginning to include sections on the environment which even, in some cases, probe the deeper philosophical issues. One of the first was Bierman & Gould's *Philosophy for a New Generation*. Rachels and Tillman (in in AEC) includes an excerpt from Whitehead and a very fine paper by Thomas Colwell, Jr contrasting the views of Mill and Spinoza.

Bierman, Gould & Needleman, *Religion for a New Generation* has a section on the crisis of ecology which includes P. Shepard's "Ecology and Man" (widely reprinted and one of the best short statements of ecophilosophy) together with a scurrilous piece by T.S. Derr. Needleman's section called "Toward a Sacred Universe: Religion and the Cosmic" contains a number of good pieces including an excellent one by S.H. Nasr (see also Needleman's essay on "Philosophy as a Religious Quest").

The 2nd ed of Burr & Goldinger, *Philosophy and Contemporary Issues* (Macmillan, 1975) now includes the section "Science & Ecology: Mysticism vs. Reason" with a beautifully unbiased and thoughtful introduction to selections from Roszak and Passmore (the Roszak selection comes from his chapter "Rhapsodic Intellect" Where the Wasteland Ends which includes a section "Ecology and the Uses of Mysticism" involving a critique of McMharg's functionalist approach to ecology).

James Christian's *Philosophy* (Rinehart, 1973) discusses the philosophical implications of ecology in several places (pp.356-9, 416-22). He leans heavily upon Schweitzer's "Reverence for Life" principle although his chapter 6-4 is a revealing example of modern Western ambivalence toward Nature - a desire for control is contrasted with an ecological sense of man's place in the scheme.


and an interesting original paper by Robert Coburn (Philosophy, Univ of Washington), "Pessimism and Morality".

Sections on ecology and animal rights are also appearing in ethics texts. Durland & Bruening, Ethical Issues (Mayfield, 1975) contains a long paper by N.O. Schedler, "Our Destruction of Tomorrow: A Philosophical Reflection on the Ecological Crisis". The 2nd ed. of J. Rachels' Moral Problems (Harper & Row, 1975) includes Singer's "Animal Liberation" and a postscript which accuses R. Wasserman, in his paper on rights, of speciesism. Richard Purtill's Thinking About Ethics (Prentice-Hall, 1976) has a section "Ecology and Ethics: Do Trees Have Rights?". Purtill mentions the deeper philosophical-religious issues involved, but settles for a more-or-less standard humanistic resolution to the issues. The conventional humanistic account of value theory is exemplified by the following (quoted from the critique by Robert E. Maginn, Program in Values, Technology, and Society, Stanford University, of Zimmerman's paper - see p. 7):

In relating Heidegger's hope for a new mode of thinking, one passing beyond the "subjectivist thinking of philosophy-science-technology," Zimmerman agrees that whatever other qualities this thought should have, it must "let things be", i.e., let them "manifest themselves in their own presence and worth, ...not merely as objects for the all powerful Subject." As I read this passage, particularly the phrase "their own...worth", it seems that Zimmerman implicitly commits himself to the belief that objects have value apart from any actual or potential benefit they may hold for man. My view, on the other hand, is that, first, value is an essentially relational notion: 'value of x' is elliptical for 'value of x to y for purpose z'; and second, following Kurt Baier (Values and the Future, p. 40), the value of a thing consists in its ability to confer a benefit upon someone. However, holding this view of value does not commit its partisans to adopt narrow, exploitative postures toward nature or the environment. One can, after all, subscribe to this subjectivist theory of value and still count present and future others as actual or possible equal co-recipients of the benefits, the capacity to confer which constitutes a thing's value. There is nothing inconsistent about holding this value theory and engaging in the stewardship of nature.

Maginn's remarks provide a fairly sharp statement of the conflict over value and orientation which divides anthropocentrists from non-anthropocentrists. For without calling into question the whole subjectivist orientation to non-human nature, as Heidegger for example does, one appears logically trapped in this kind of value analysis. I find it necessary, for example, to escape the bias of the subjectivist orientation by exploring, in my ethics classes, the religious issues which Purtill evades. In addition to standard humanistic ethical texts, e.g., John Hospers, Human Conduct and B. L. Leiser's Liberty, Justice and Morals I also use R. Nash's Wilderness and the American Mind with Leopold's Sand County Almanac as supplementary. In the first 3 chs of Nash, the man-nature issue is explored by contrasting the Judeo-Christian orientation with Eastern views. The chapters on Thoreau, Muir, and Leopold then lead gradually through the Romantics to the development of a non-anthropocentric ethic while providing nice contrasts along the way with a utilitarian subjectivist orientation to Nature.

In a recent flyer, we are told that the 6th ed of Right and Reason: Ethics in Theory & Practice (Mosby, 1976) by Austin Fagot, S.J., will include a chapter "on the 'earth' which deals with the responsibilities of individuals, institutions, and nations to the environment." Hopefully, this will be at least a partial atonement for Jesuit priest James Schall's attack on ecology as a heresy; as "dangerous" and "unbalanced" in contrast with a "pragmatic recognition of cleanliness and conservation" (Time magazine, Aug 23, 1971, pp. 29-30).
The best anthologies now in print from an ecophilosopy perspective are Forstner & Todd, The Everlasting Universe (see PMM fn 29), R. Disch, The Ecological Conscience (Prentice-Hall, 1970), and Disch & Harney, The Dying Generations (Dell, 1971). E.F. Schumacher's Small is Beautiful: Economics as If People Mattered attempts to provide a religious-metaphysical-ethical container for economic theory and activities (see his chapter on Buddhist economics). One is reminded of Gary Snyder's remark, "Economics must be seen as a small sub-branch of ecology".

7. Mysticism and Ecology

Every cosmography contains a creation story and the Naturalists are no different in this respect, save in the nature of the evidence employed. The unknown is the threshold of their minds; wonder is a constant companion, but mysticism is not conspicuous. In support of their concept of creation they employ, not mysticism, but replicable experiment...As the Naturalists deny themselves the luxury of mysticism and assume that all meaning and purpose can be inferred from the operation of the biophysical world, it is here that they have searched for an ethic...What is (man's) role? Surely it was a cooperative mechanism sustaining the biosphere, and this was the great value of apperception, the key to man's role as steward, the agent of symbioses (Ian McHarg, "The Naturalists" in Forstner & Todd, The Everlasting Universe, pp. 359-62).

McHarg is an ecologically-oriented architectural theorist but no mystic, and in the latter orientation, he is merely echoing the sentiments of Western "no-nonsense" scientific naturalists since the Enlightenment for whom mysticism embodies the very essence of conceptual confusion, primitive myth, and superstition - the enemy to be vanquished in the march of progress toward a thoroughly rational secularized technologically-controlled and managed society and Nature(T. Roszak's books treat this issue beautifully). It is as if a conscious conspiracy has been carried out to rewrite (ala 1984) the history of Western philosophy, science, and religion to expunge or at least minimize the mystical elements in the systems of the Presocratics, Plato, Copernicus, Bruno, Kepler, Spinoza, Newton, Einstein, Heisenberg, Schrodinger, Russell, and Wittgenstein.(see e.g., Pirsig's interpretation with the interpretation of Plato at the Univ of Chicago; Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance, part IV; see also AEC, p.6). Bertrand Russell's comments on the compatibility of mysticism and science are to be taken seriously - the emphasis I placed upon the centrality of his "The Essence of Religion" as well as "Mysticism and Logic" for an understanding of his philosophic-religious views (PMM p 21, fn 56) has been independently reinforced by Ronald Jager (The Development of Bertrand Russell's Philosophy, Humanities Press, 1972, pp. 484ff).

Contemporary academic philosophers have largely aided and abetted this "anti-mystical conspiracy" in the development of their essentially positivistic epistemological theories. Mysticism is usually discussed in the standard textbooks (see e.g., PMM fn 34) in connection with arguments for the existence of God, as "religious experience" and is forthwith summarily dismissed. It is the mark of the parochialism of recent academic philosophy that textbook discussions of the existence of God center mainly around a logical and conceptual analysis of theism. A remark by Paul Edwards indicates the standard orientation, "For our purposes it will be convenient to consider somebody a believer in God if he asserts the existence of a supreme personal being who is the creator of the universe or at least the designer of some of its prominent features... Thus pantheists, who deny that God and the universe are distinct and who therefore cannot believe in creation, will not be counted as believers in God" (A Modern Intro to Philosophy, Revised ed., Free Press, 1965, p. 372). No wonder students who have read Hesse, Watts, Snyder, Castaneda, or Laing find analytic philosophy courses literally narrow-minded and increasingly "irrelevant". By thus disposing of theism, the assumption is that the way is clear for positivistic humanistic Enlightenment secularis
forgetting that Friedrich Schleiermacher, the "father of liberal theology" had held that the basis of religion is a distinctive religious awareness. As Ian Barbour describes Schleiermacher's views (Issues in Science and Religion, Prentice-Hall, 1966, p. 106):

The element common to all religions (Schleiermacher) described as a "feeling of absolute dependence", a sense of the finitude before the infinite, an awareness of unity with the whole.

One of the most dramatic defections from the party line in recent years was the philosophical "about-face" of the Princeton philosopher, Walter T. Stace. Immediately following WWII, Stace wrote an essay ("Man Against Darkness" Atlantic Monthly, Vol CLXXII, Jul-Dec, 1948) outlining the prevailing existentialist-scientific naturalist world view with its sense of overriding purposelessness and cosmic and biological alienation. This was later expanded into a book, Religion and the Modern Mind, 1952. Shortly thereafter, apparently sensing that this world view was a "path without a heart" (Castaneda), Stace moved solidly into the mystic camp with his Mysticism and Philosophy (1960) and Time and Eternity. Fortunately, a few philosophy anthologies are now beginning to provide a more sympathetic hearing for mysticism. Rachels & Tillman, Philosophical Issues contains a section on mysticism and reality including a selection from Stace called "The Objectivity of Mystical Experience" from Stace, Man Against Darkness (Univ of Pittsburgh Press, 1967). Burton Porter's Personal Philosophy (Harcourt, 1976) includes a section from Evelyn Underhill's Mysticism and Russell's "Mysticism and Logic" although he edits out some of the important material at the beginning. James Ogilvy's Self and World (Harcourt, 1973) has a nice section on mysticism including Stace's "Mysticism and Reason" (Univ of Arizona Bulletin Series, Vol XXVI No 3, May 1955) and a reply to Stace by another mystic, John Findlay (Philosophy, Yale Univ) "The Logic of Mysticism".

As the positivistic mentality gradually loses its grip and effective censorship over Western society, clandestine mystics begin to emerge in the most unlikely places. Among biologists, see the chapter "Evolutionary Theology: The New Mysticism" in G.G. Simpson, This View of Life (Harcourt, 1964). Theodosius Dobzhansky, the "Darwin of the 20th century" was a former president of the American Teilhard de Chardin Association (see his papers, "Teilhard de Chardin and the Orientation of Evolution" Zygon, Vol 3 No 3, Sept 1968; "Evolution and Man's Conception of Himself" Teilhard Review, Vol 5 No 2, 1970-71; "Teilhard and Monad - Two Conflicting World Views" Teilhard Review, Vol 8, No 2, June 1973). I must admit that I find Teilhard's mystical system much too otherworldly and anthropocentric - perhaps the latter is an occupational disease of planetary evolutionary biologists from Huxley to Dobzhansky. For a partial corrective to biological anthropocentrism see John Lilly's writings on dolphins and whales, John Livingston's One Cosmic Instant, and the writings of most ecologists, for that matter. The speculations of exobiologists helps put man in perspective from a cosmic standpoint (see PMM p. 15, fn 37, and James Christian's new anthology on exobiology).

Undoubtedly the most exciting books to be published recently in the area of the rapprochement of science and mysticism are William Irwin Thompson's Passages About Earth (Harper & Row, 1973) and Jacob Needleman's A Sense of the Cosmos: The Encounter of Modern Science and Ancient Truth (Doubleday, 1975). Thompson is the author of At the Edge of History and recently was the subject of a 3-page interview "The Mechanists and the Mystics" in Time magazine (Aug 21, 1972). In his most recent book, Thompson takes us on an odyssey which begins with his dropping out from academia, traveling the world interviewing those involved in the science-mysticism interface (Paolo Soleri, Peccci and the Club of Rome, Heisenberg, and von Weizsacker, Gopi Krishna and the Research Foundation for Eastern Wisdom and Western Science, etc.) and ends with the
establishment of a spiritual community. Running through both Thompson's and Needleman's books is the contrast between Pythagorean mystical contemplative science and the Archimedean technological manipulative Baconian orientation of modern Western science.

Jacob Needleman (Philosophy, S.F. State Univ) has produced the philosophically more systematic and ambitious work. Like Thompson, he seems to be headed toward a transcendental mysticism (ala Teilhard) which derives, in part, from the more sophisticated psychological techniques of the East and esoteric West. His discussion of the microcosm-macrocsm analogy in this connection is provocative (see also AEC pp 7-8; PMM pp 5-6). Not only does he provide an interesting critique of pragmatism, but his description of the attempt to establish a community of "New Pythagorean" scientists is fascinating (There is considerable debate going on these days concerning the influence of Neo-Pythagoreanism and Hermeticism in the development of modern science, much of it stemming from Francis Yates' Giordano Bruno and the Hermetic Tradition see e.g., M. Hesse, "Hermeticism and Historiography" and E. Rosen, "Was Copernicus a Hermetic?" in R.H. Stewar, Historical and Philosophical Perspectives of Science. William Leiss (The Domination of Nature, Ch 2) admits the influence of the Hermetics on modern science, but argues that the influence of the Magus actually resulted in a view of magic as the key to unlocking the secrets of Nature from a desire to "possess power and riches"). One of the most startling ideas Needleman advances is that heliocentrism and the concept of a non-anthropocentric universe are actually ancient ideas which had cosmic meaning only within an esoteric-religious frame of reference. Modern science rediscovered this ancient view of the world but lacked the religious "container" within which it was to be properly interpreted (One is reminded here of Joseph Needham's thesis in his multi-volumned Science and Civilization in China, recounted to me by Gary Snyder, that a strong esoteric tradition in the East provided a spiritual container which kept science and technology in check for many centuries. See also Joseph Needham's recent essay, "History and Human Values; A Chinese Perspective for World Science and Technology", Centennial Review Vol XX No 1, Winter, 1976).

8. Teaching Philosophy as Synoptic Cosmic Ecophilosophy

PHILOSOPHY 6 INTRO. TO PHILOSOPHY Assigned Text: James Christian, Philosophy Students write critical papers on any two of the following books which are arranged roughly in order of reading difficulty and as a "path". Final paper is on Stace, "Man Against Darkness".

1. G. Tyler Miller, Replenish the Earth.
3. John Lilly. Lilly on Dolphins
4. Rolf Edberg. At the Foot of the Tree
5. John Livingston. One Cosmic Instant
6. R. Pirsig. Zen and the Art of Motorcycle Maintenance
7. William I. Thompson. Passages About Earth

PHILOSOPHY 40 RATIONALITY MYSTICISM AND ECOLOGY

1. DH Lawrence "The Death of Pan" & I. Mc Harg "The Naturalists" in Forstner & Todd.
2. Theodore Roszak. The Making of a Counterculture
3. " Where the Wasteland Ends
4. Gary Snyder, Turtle Island